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Cities throughout the natio n are plagued by the growth of crimi-
nal street gangs .1 To combat this growth, state and local governments 
have enacted a wide variety of legislation increasing criminal sanctions 
for gang behavior. 2 In add ition, state and local governments have 
1 See, e.g. , Daniel J . Monti, Origins and Problem~· of Gang Research in !he Uniled Slales, in 
GANGS 1, 1 (Scott Cummings & Dani el J. Monti eds., 1993) (noting sharp ri se in gang-related 
crime over the last decade); JOHN M. HAGEDORN & PERRY MA CON, PEOPLE AND FoLKs: 
GANGS, CRIME AN D TH E UNDERCLASS IN A RusT!lELT CITY 11-18 (1988) (comparing Milwaukee 
gangs to gangs in Los Angeles) ; Daniel J. Monti , Gangs in 1Hore- all(/ Less-Se/1/ed Communi1ies, 
in GANGS, supra, at 2 19 (discussing gang activity in St. Louis); N. Denise Burke , Comment, 
ReslriCiing Gang Clo1hing in 1he Public Schools , 80 Eouc. L. REP. 513, 513 (1993) (noting in-
crease in ga ng violence in Shreve port , Louisiana , and Bellingham, Washington); Ga ry Lee, Big-
Cily-S!yle Gangs Find a New Frontier on Plains of Kansas, L.A. TI MES, Aug. 8, 1993, at B4 
(Bulldog ed .) (reporting gang problems in Wichita). TI1is conclusion is not universally shared. 
Some researchers sugges t that the incre ase in reports of gang- related crime reflects changes in 
data co llection rather than rea l increases in gang-related crime. E.g., Susan L. Burrell , Gang 
Evidence: Issues for Criminal Defense. 30 SANTA CLARA L. R Ev. 739, 741 & nn. 7, 8 (1990). 
Fu rthermore, variations in the way data on gang vio lence is co llected throughout the count ry 
makes inferring na tional I rends and making ci ty-to-c ity compari sons problematic. See Chery l L. 
Maxson & Malcolm W. Klein. Srreer Gang Violence: Twice as Grear. or Half as Grear?, in GANGS 
IN AMERICA 71.91 (C. Ronald Huffed., 1990) (noting that est imates o f gang vi ole nce in differ-
ent cities va ry with the definiti on of gang violence); IRA REINER, OFFICE OF TilE DISTRICT AT-
TORNEY, GANGS, C RIM E A:--ID VIOLENCE IN Los A NGE LES 148 ( 1992) (noti ng standards for 
reporting ga ng crime va ry from department to departm ent with in the sa me jurisdiction). 
2 For exa mple . states have enacted stututes crimin ali zi ng participation in gangs, e.g., ARK. 
CoDE ANN. § 5-74-108 (Michie 1993); CA L PENAL Co DE § 186.22(a) (West Supp. 1994); GA . 
CoDE ANN. § 16-15-4 (Supp. 1993); IND. CoDE ANN . § 35 -45-9-3 (West Supp. 1993); IowA 
CoDE ANN. § 723A.I-.2 (West 1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 578.423 (Vernon Su pp. 1994): Act of 
Dec. 10, 1993, § 128, 1993 W1s. LAws 98 (to be codif1ed a t Wt s. STAT. § 895.77) , enh ancing 
sentences of gang members, e.g. , CA L PENAL CoDE § 186.22(b) (Wes t Su pp. 1994) ; GA. CODE 
ANN.§ 16-15-5 (S upp. 1993); MIN:-<. STAT. ANN.§ 609.229 (West Supp. 1994); Mo . ANN. STAT. 
§ 578 .425 (Vernon Supp. 1994); NEv. REv. STAT. AN N. § 193.168 (M ich ie 1992); Martin Berg, 
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turned with increasing frequ ency to civil remedies to augment their 
criminal law enforcement efforts.3 
Gangs pose a particularly acute problem in California. 4 Reports 
of gang violence are increasing, and gang-related homicides are at an 
a ll-time high in the Los Angeles area. 5 Despite the enactment of new 
criminal sanctions to combat gangs6 and the use of existing law en-
forcement techniques at their constitutional limits,7 these efforts have 
Oregon Raises Senrences for Gang Mem bers , L.A . DAlLY J., Aug. 12, 1988, at 3, criminalizing the 
e ncourageme nt of minors to participate in gangs, e. g. , OKLA. STAT. A:-<N. tit. 21, ~ 856 (West 
Supp. 1994). subjec ting stree t gan gs to s ta tutes des igned to curb organ ized crime , e.g., T Ex. PE-
NAL Co DE ANN. §§ 71.01-71.05 (West Supp. 19\14), and penalizing pare nts fo r th e ir children's 
involvement in gangs, see Wil liams v. Re ine r, 853 P.2d 507 , 510 (Cal. 1\193) (reasoning tha t 1988 
a men dm ent to juve nile delinquency statut e was intended to enlist parents in the antigang fig ht); 
MaryS. Penn , Parenrs Could Be Fined !f Their Kids Join Gangs. C111. TRm., Se pt. 8, 1994, metro 
south wes t sec .. at 3 (reporting e nactme nt o f ordinance subj ec ting parents to tin es and misde-
mean o r prosecution for their children's gang me mbership). 
3 For example , states have enacted statutes a utho rizing buildings hab itua ll y used fo r gang 
activity to be declared public nuisances, e. g., ARK. CoDE A""·§ 5-74-109 (Michie 1993) ; C.'\L. 
PENAL CoD E § 186.22a (West Supp. 1994); FLA. STAT. ch. 893. 138 (Supp. 1993); IowA ConE 
ANN.§ 657.2 (West Supp. 1993); LA. R Ev . STAT. A NN. § 15:1405 (Wes t 1992); Mo . AN N. STAT. 
§§ 578.430-.433 (Vernon Supp. 1994); T Ex. C1v. PR AC. & REM. CoDE ANN. § 125.063 (West 
1994), a utho rizing a civil cause of actio n against gangs, e.g. , 740 ILL COMP. STAT. § 147/15 
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994); LA. R Ev. STAT. ANN.§ 15:1405.1 (West Supp. 1994) , and authorizing 
the fo rfeiture of weapons used in ga ng activity , e.g. , LA. REv. STAT. A NN . § 15:1405.1; M o . ANN. 
STAT. § 578.435 -.437 (Vernon Supp. 1994). 
4 Burrell , supra note l, at 741 (notin g that Sou thern California is facing "an unprecede nted 
ga ng holocaust"). 
5 REJNER, supra note 1, at 83, 99, 148; Burrell, supra note 1, at 741. Paradoxically, gang 
violence in East Los Angeles has been decreasi ng over the past decade. Joan Moore , Gangs, 
Dmgs, and Violence, in G ANGs, supra note 1, at 27, 37. R egardless , the shocking nature of 
ce rtain gang- re lated crimes, such as drive-by gang shootings and slayings of innocent bystanders 
and the inte nse media cove rage that accompanies the m have heightened public a nxiety abou t 
gang violence even though these crimes may comprise only a small percentage of gang-re lated 
homicides. See Patrick Jackson & Cary Rudma n, Moral Panic and the Response to Gangs in 
California, in GANGS , supra note 1, at 257, 264-65; REtNER, supra note 1, at 106-07. 
6 Some Ca lifornia cities have passed o rdin ances banning gang me mbers from ce rtain areas. 
See Richard L. Colvin, Judge Issues Sweeping lnjuncrion Againsr Gong, L.A. T lMES, Apr. 8 , 1993, 
a t B 1 (home ed. ) (reporting municipal ordinan ce bann ed gangs from parks in Pomo na); Jim H. 
Zamora , Gang Ban Solves Problems f or One Neighborhood. L.A. TlMES, Mar. 7, 1993, a t B3 
(Valley ed.) (reporting municipal o rdinance banned gangs from parks in San fern ando) . Other 
cit ies are considering similar ordin ances. Patrick J. McDonne ll , Plan ro Ban Gangs from Parks 
Hir , L.A. TJ MES, May 17 , 1993, a t 81 (ho me ed.) (reporting municipal ordinance banning gangs 
from parks being considered in Los Ange les); Matt Lait, Ciry Pon ders Law ro Haufe Drugs in 
Parks, L.A. T lMES, Sept. 28, 1993, at B1 (Orange Co unty ed.) (reporting municipa l ordina nce 
banning gangs from parks being considered in Anaheim). Similar efforts by private citizens have 
pro ven less successful. See Sari Wilson, Big Suirs, AM. LAw., Se pt. 1991, at 38; "Gang Members" 
Denied Enrrance ro Them e Park File Civil Rig/us Suir, TllE R ECO RD ER (San Francisco), July 31, 
1991 , at 3 (stating that amusement park dropped poli cy of exc luding perso ns ba sed on a gang-
profi le). 
7 For exam ple, police have begun cond ucting ·'gang sweeps," stopping and ques tioning sus-
pected gang members often based merely upon how they are dressed . See Burre ll. supra note 1, 
at 742-43; Gordon Dillow, Police Bag rhe Baggy Pwus Crowd in an Effo rt ro Rid Mall of Gangs , 
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not quelled the increase in gang-related crime.8 Consequentiy, Caii-
fornia has been particularly innovative in using civil remedies to con-
trol gang activity. 9 
O ne such innovation is taking place in the cities of Los Angeles, 10 
Burbank,11 San Jose ,12 Westminster, 13 Oakland, 14 and Norwalk, 15 
where ci ty attorneys have asked courts to declare ce rtain street gangs 
o r ga ng members public nuisances and to enter injunctions to abate 
them. 16 C ity officials and community members report that these in-
junctions have been extremely effective in red ucing gang activity. 17 
Because of their success and the universal availability of public nui-
L.A. TIM ES, Dec. 3 1, 1993, a t B5 (South Bay ed.) (reporting that po li ce in Torrance con du ct gang 
sweeps orderi ng ga ng members out o f shopping malls). Th ese methods have drawn severe criti-
cism from civil libertaria ns. E.g., Debra R. Schultz, Comment, "The Righr 10 be l ,er Alone''· 
Fourrh Amemlmenr Rigflls and Gang Violence, 16 W. ST. U. L. RE v . 7'2 5, 734-35 ( 1989). 
8 Nick A nde rson, S.J. Makes Mo ve to Reclaim Gang Terrirory, SAN Jo sE MERCURY N Ews , 
Mar. 10. 1993, at ! A (report ing that traditional police methods had proven insuftici ent to control 
gang ac ti vity in Rocksprings a rea of San Jose) ; Colvin, sup ra not e 6 (reporting same in Bl yth e 
St reet area o f Va n Nuys); Mark I. Pinsky, O.C. Anti-Gang Tactic Ruled Unconsriturional, L.A. 
T IMES, Aug. 31, 1993, a t A1 (Orange County eel.) (reporting same in Westminster); Jim H. 
Zamora, Ban L oosens Gang 's Grip on a Burbank Street, L.A. Tn,IES, Nov. 1, 1992 . a t B3 (Valley 
ed.) (reporti ng same in Burbank). 
9 See Burre ll. supra note 1, at 743-44 (noting Los Angeles County effo rt to enjoin ga ng-
re lated graffiti as a public nuisance) ; Mark Thompson, A Gangland Nuisance, CAL. LAw., Jan.-
Feb. 1988, at 21 (same). 
10 People v. Playboy G angster Crips, No. WEC 118860 (Ca l. Super. Ct. Los Angeles County 
Dec. 11, 1987); People v. Blythe St. Gang, No. LC 020525 (Cal. Supe r. Ct. Los Angeles County 
A pr. 7, 1993) . 
11 People ex rei. Fle tcher v. Acosta , No. EC 010205 (Cal. Super. Ct. Los A ngeles Cou nty 
Nov. 2, 1992). 
12 People ex rei. City Attorney v. Acuna, No. 729322 (Cal. Super. Ct. Santa Clara County 
June 28, 1993); People ex rei. City Attorney v. Avalos, No. CV 739089 (Cal. Super. Ct. Santa 
Cla ra County Mar. 30, 1994). 
13 People ex rei. Jones v. Amaya, No. 713223 (Cal. Super. Ct. Orange County Nov. 10, 1993). 
14 People v. "B" St. Boys, No. 735405-4 (Cal. Super. Ct. A lameda Co unt y June 17, 1994). 
15 City of Norwalk v. Orange St. Locos, No. VC 016746 (Cal. Super. Ct. Los A ngeles County 
Aug. 25, 1994). 
16 Other states have enacted statutes specifically a uthoriz ing stree t gangs to be enjoined as 
public nu isances. E.g. , 740 ILL. Co MP. STAT.§ 147/35 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994); TEx . Crv. PRA C. 
& REM. Co DE A NN . § 125.062 (West 1994). 
17 See, e.g., Mike Cassidy, S.J. Neighborhood on the Rebound: Crack doom on Gangs in 
Rocksprings G ets Credit f or Drop in Crime, SAN JosE MERCU RY NEws. Sep t. 15, 1993, at lB 
(stati ng that city officials and community report Acuna injunct ion e ffective in red ucing crim e); 
Jeanette Regalado, A Reason to Celebrate: Blythe Street Residem s Hold a Fes1iva/, Promising a 
N ew Era in 1he Crime-Ridden Neighborhood, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1994, at B1 (Valley eel .) (no t-
ing improvement in ne ighborhood since Blythe S treet injunction); WesiSide Gang Crim e Off. L.A. 
T IM ES, June 2, 1988, § 2, at 3 (home ed.) (reporting that gang re la ted crime dropped 30% since 
Playboy Gangsrer Crips injunction); Zamora, supra note 6 (noting th at Acosra injuncti on was 
effective in curbing crime). Residents of ne ighborhoods in which antiga ng injunctions have re-
cently bee n issued look forward to similar benefits. See Duke H elfa nd , Judge Issues Injun ction 
A gainsl Gang in Norwalk, L. A. T III.t ES, Aug. 26, 1994, at Bl (home eel.). 
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sance doctrine, other municipalit ies facing burgeoning gang problems 
are considering pursuing similar injunctions.18 
H owever , these antigang injunctions raise difficult constitutiona l 
questions. 19 For instance, since court orders can prohibit o th erwise 
lega l conduct, they operate as personal criminal codes that may in-
fringe upon defendants' substantive constitutional rights.20 In addi-
tion , employing a civil remedy such as an injunction may deprive 
defendants of constitutional procedural protections tha t would have 
been provided if the jurisdicti on had elected to deter the same behav-
ior with available criminal sanctions.2l 
Drawi ng on the Califo rnia antigang injunctions as exampl es, this 
Comment addresses th ese constitutional questions by considering 
whether anti gang injunctions violate e ither the substantive or proce-
dural rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution.22 Part Il 
18 Lee H arris, Order Sought to Control Gang in Harbor Cicy, L.A. TiMES, Apr. 22, 1993, § 5. 
at 7 (Sout h Bay ed.) (re porting that Harbor City, Californ ia, is seeking an ant igang injunction ); 
Susan Leonard & Victoria Harke r, "Use a Deadly Weapon, Go to Prison": Romley to Push 
Suffer Terms, End of Plea Deals, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Sept. 15, 1993, at Bl (reporting that Phoenix 
is considering an an: igang injunction); Pau l F. Rosell , Public Forum: An Outcry on Crime, Pun-
ishment and Taxes, WiCHITA EAG LE, Sept. 16, 1993, at lOa (calling on Wichita to seek an anti-
gang injunc tion). 
19 The difficulty o f the const itutiona l issues is demonst rated by the different conclusions 
reached by th e co urts that have conside red these injunct ions' constitutionality. See infra notes 
46, 49, 51-53 and acco mpanyi ng text. 
20 See Madse n v. Women's Health Ctr. , Inc .. 114 S. Ct. 2516,2524 (1994) (" Injunctions . 
carry greater risks of ce nsorship and discriminato ry applicat ion than do o rdinances."); Mary M. 
Che h, Constiwtional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: Un-
derstan ding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil L aw Distinction, 42 HASTINGS L.J . 1325, 1407 
(1991); Te rence R. Boga , Note, Turf Wars: Street Gangs, Local Governments, and the Battle f or 
Public Space, 29 HAR.V. C.R.-C.L. L. R Ev. 477, 494-99 ( 1994). 
21 See Che h, supra note 20, at 1329, 1389 -94 . 
22 Because thi s Comment is primaril y concerned with the potential use of a ntigang injunc-
tions na tio nwide, it wi ll focus on whether these injunctions violate the United States Const itu-
tion. Consequently, this Comment will not add ress issues that a ri se under state s ta tutory and 
common law, such as the scope of nuisance doctrine or the ap pl ication of equitable principles in 
issuing injunctions. 
Nor will thi s Comment add ress issues that arise under sta te consti tutions. State const itu -
tional claims should no t be ignored , however, since s tate constitutio ns also protect persona l li b-
erties. See William J . Bre nnan, Jr., Sta te Constillltions and the Protection of fndividual Rights, 90 
HAKV. L. REv . 489, 495 ( 1977) (noting that sta te cons titutions have historically bee n th e primary 
guarantor of civil libe rti es and that states a re increasingly providing grea te r protect ion of civil 
li berties than provided by the United States Co nstitution). State constitutions often provide 
greater protecti on of individual rights th an the federal constitution. Compare Ci ty of Sa nta Bar-
bara v. Adamson, 610 P .2d 436 (Ca l. 1980) (holding zoning ordinance prohibiting unrelated per-
sons from living together viola ted Califo rnia's textually-based constitutional right to pri vacy) 
with Village of Be lle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (holdi ng almost ide ntical zonin g ordi-
nance did not violate fede ra l non-textually-based constitutional right to privacy). It is notewor-
thy that o ne cour t based its refusal to grant an antigang injunction in part on the Californi a 
Const itu tion 's ri ght to privacy. People ex rei. Jo nes v. A maya , No. 713223 , slip op. a t 4 (Ca l. 
Super. Ct. Orange Coun ty Nov. 10, 1993) (order denying preliminary injunction) . A no ther a rea 
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1rovides the background for the analysis by describing the history of 
he Ca lifornia injunctions and outlining the types of injunction terms 
hat raise the most salient constitutio nal concerns. Part III then dis-
usses whether the injunction terms identified in Part II infringe on 
tny substantive constitutional rights. Part IV continues the constitu-
io na l analysis with an evaluation of whether certain types of injunc-
io n te rms are overbroad or void for vagueness. Part V then considers 
.vhether the procedures commonly fo llowed in iss uing antigang in-
unctions comply with the requirements of due process and a rgues for 
::xpanded procedural clue process protecti on. Finally, Part VI con-
:lucles that for the most part, a properly drafted antigang injunction 
;hou ld be fo und constitutional. Neverthe less, Part VI reasserts Part 
V's argument that defendants of these injunctions should be given 
greater procedural protections than normally associated with civil 
remedies. 
II. ANTIGAN G I NJ UNCTIO NS IN CALIFORN IA 
The antigang injunction cases in Californi a provide a useful start-
ing point for an analysis of antigang injunctions' constitutionality. 
TI1is Part describes these injunctions, which taken together illustrate 
the wide range of views courts have taken of antigang injunctions' 
constitutionality, the type of terms included in such injunctions, and 
the type of procedures used to implement them. Section A begins the 
analysis by tracing the history of the antigang injunctions. Section B 
th en organizes the most constitutionally significant injunction terms 
into specific categories to structure the subsequent analyses of 
whether the antigang injunctions violate the alleged gang members ' 
constitutional rights. 
A. The Antigang Injunctions: West Los Angeles, Burbank, Blythe 
Street, San Jose, Westminster, Oakland, and Norwalk 
On D ecember 10, 1987, Los Angeles Superior Court Judge War-
ren Deering issued the first antigang injunction against a gang known 
as the Playboy Gangster Crips.23 Applying California's general nui-
in which state constitu tions and courts may provide greater protec tio n of gang members is equal 
protec tion, particularly if cities disproportionately enjoin minority gangs. See Stale v. Russe ll , 
477 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1991) (subjecting statute tha t disproportionately burdened minorities to 
mo re penetrating scrutiny under the state constitution 's equal pro tection clause th an under the 
federal equal protection clause); Paul D. Murphy, Note, Resrricring Gang Clothing in Public 
Schools: Does a Dress Code Violate a Studem 's Right of Free Expression?, 64 S. CAL. L. R Ev. 
!321. 1356-58 (1991) (noting equal protect ion prob le ms if gang dress codes are enfo rced primar-
ily aga inst minority gangs) . 
23 Peopl e v. Playboy Gangster Crips, No. WEC 118860 (Cal. Super. C t. Los A ngeles Cou nty 
Dec. 11 , 1987) (p reliminary injunction ); see Burrell, supra note 1, at 744 & n.19; Schul tz, supra 
note 7, at 733 -34; Boga, supra note 20, at 478 -79: Thompson, supra note 9. 
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sance statutes, 24 the court declared the entire three-hundred member 
gang a public nuisance and issued a six-point preliminary injunction 
against it throughout a twenty-six block neighborhoocl.25 
However, Judge D eering die! not grant all of the injunction terms 
requested by the Los Angeles City Attorney. For instance, he refused 
to impose a curfew or prohibit gang members from dressing in gang 
fashion or associating with other gang members.26 Calling these pro-
visions "overbroad in content" and " fa r, far overreaching," Judge 
D eering said the injuncti on, if approved as originally requested, would 
have "violate[ d) basic constitutionalliberties."27 Consequently, Judge 
Deering limited th e scope of the injunction to acts already illegal 
under Ca lifornia law.zs 
Even in this limited form, the injunction reportedly was effective 
in curbing gang-rel a ted crime.29 In the six months fo llowing the impo-
sition of the injunction , the City Attorney noted that major felonies 
dropped eighteen percent and gang-related crime dropped thirty per-
cent.30 R esidents also noted a marked reduction in crime throughout 
the neighborhood in which the injunction was effective.31 Since the 
City Attorney felt that the preliminary injunction had solved th e 
24 Under California law, a nuisance is defined as "a nything which is injurious to health , or is 
indece nt or offens ive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to inter-
fere with the comfo rtable enjoyme nt of life or unlawfully obstructs the free passage or use , in 
customary manner o f ... any public park, square, stree t or highway." CAL. Ov. CoDE § 3479 
(West 1970). A public nuisa nce is de fin ed as " one which affects at the same time an e ntire 
community o r neighborhood, or any considerable number of perso ns, although the extent of 
damage inflicted upo n individuals may be unequal." § 3480. The proper way to abate a nuisance 
is with an injunction. § 3491. City Attorneys a re authorized to bring actions to abate public 
nuisances. CA L. Crv. PRoc. CoDE § 73 1 (West 1980). 
25 People v. Play boy Gangster Crips, No. WEC 118860, slip op. at 3 (Cal. Super. C t. Los -
Ange les County Dec. 11, 1987) (preliminary injunction); see also Los Angeles Proseclllors to Use l 
Injun ction Against Street Gang, CRtM. J usT. NEWSL., Jan . 4, 1988, at 20; Regional News: Califo r- . 
nia, UPI, D ec. 11, 1987, available in LEXIS, News Library, UPI File. 
26 Compare Complaint for Temporary R est raining Order, and for Preliminary and Perma- ( 
ne nt Injunction , to Abate Public Nuisa nce a t 11 -13, Playboy Gcngster Crips (No. WEC 118860) . , 
(filed Oct. 26, 1987) with People v. Playboy G angster C rips, No. WEC 118860, slip op. at 3 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. Los Angeles County Dec. 11, 1987) (preliminary injunctio n). See also Los Angeles 
Proseclllors 10 Use Injun ction Against Street Gang, supra note 25. 
27 See Pa ul Feldman , Judge Raps City Atty.'s Bid 10 Neutralize Gangs, L.A . TIMES, Dec. 11 , 
1987 , § 2, at 3 (home ed.) [he re inafte r Feldman , Judge Raps]; Paul Feldman, Judge OKs Modified 
Measures to Curb Gang, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1987, § 2, at 3 (home ed.). These quoted state-
ments appear only on the decision and do no t appear o n the face of the order. 
28 The preliminary inj unc tion prohibi ted only trespass ing, defacing prope rty, blocking public 
ways, urinating or defecating in public , littering, and "annoy[ing) , harass[ ing) , intimidat[ing), 
threaten[ing) or molest[in g] any resident, neighbor o r citizen. " People v. Playboy Gangster 
Crips, No. WEC 118860, slip op. a t 3 (Ca l. Supe r. Ct. Los Angeles County Dec. 11, 1987) (pre -
limin ary injunction); see also Fe ldman, Judge Raps, supra no te 27. 
29 See H arris, supra no te 18. 
30 See id. ; Westside Gang Crime Off, supra note 17. 
3 i See Harris, supra note 18; Westside Gang Crime Off, supra note 17. 
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problems at which it was aimed, he made no motion to make the in-
junction permanent, and it lapsed after one yea r.32 
Despite the success of the Playboy Gangster Crips injunction , no 
other city atte mpted to enjoin street gang activity for nea rly fi ve years. 
However, between October 1992 and July 1994, antigang injuncti ons 
were sought in seven separate cases: People ex rel. Fletcher v. A costa,3 3 
Peop le v. B lyth e Street Gang,34 People ex ref. City A ttorney v. A cuna,3s 
People ex rel. Jones v. Amaya,36 People ex ref. City Attorney v. 
Avalos,37 Peop le v. "B " Street Boys,38 and City of No rwalk v. Orange 
Street Locos. J9 
Courts granted the requested injunctio ns in Acosta.40 Blythe 
Stt·eet,41 A cuna ,4 2 Avalos;n and Orange Street Locos.44 On ly in Bly the 
32 See Zamora. supra note 6. 
33 Complai !1t fo r Temporary Restrain ing O rd er, Prel imin ary and Permane nt Injunctio ns to 
Aba te a Public Nuisance. People ex ref. Fle tche r v. Acosta, No. EC 010205 (Ca l. Super. Ct. Los 
Angeles County tiled Oct. 7, 1992). 
3-l Complaint for Pre limin ary and Perm ane nt Inju nction to Aba te Pu bl ic Nuisa nce. People v. 
Blythe St. G ang, No. LC 020525 (Cal. Super. Ct. Los Angeles Co un ty fil ed Fe b. 22, 1993) . 
35 Com plaint fo r Te mporary Restraining O rde r, Pre li mi nary a nd Permane nt Injunct ions to 
Abate a Public N uisa nce, People ex rei. City Atto rney v. Acun a, No. 729322 (Ca l. Supe r. C t. 
Sa nta C!Jra County fil ed Feb. 26, 1993) . 
36 Complaint for Te mporary Restrain ing O rde r, Preliminary and Pe rmanent Inj unctions to 
Aba te a Publ ic N uisance, People ex rei. Jo nes v. A maya, No. 7 13223 (Ca l. Supe r. C t. O range 
Counr y fi led June 30, 1993). 
37 Compla int fo r Temporary Restraining O rder, Prel imin ary and Perma nent Injunction to 
A bate a Public Nuisance, People ex rei. City A ttorney v. Ava los, No. C V 739089 (Ca l. Super. Ct. 
Santa Cla ra Coun ty fil ed Mar. 16, 1994). 
38 Complaint fo r Injunction a nd Equitable R elief to Abate a Publ ic Nuisance, People v. "B " 
St. Boys, No. 735405-4 (Cal. Supe r. Ct. Alameda County fil ed May 18, 1994) . 
39 Complaint fo r Pe rmanent Injunctio n to Abate a Public Nuisance, City of Norwalk v. O r-
ange St. Locos, No. VC 01 6746 (Cal. Supe r. C t. Los Angeles County fil ed July 21, 1994). 
40 People ex rei. Fletcher v. Acosta, No. E C 010205 (Cal. Super. Ct. Los Angeles County 
Nov. 2, 1992) (o rder gran ting prel iminary injunction) ; see also Boga, sup ra note 20, a t 480- 8 1. 
R eportedl y, the A costa injunction has not been seriously challenged in court. See Za mora, sup ra 
no te 6. 
41 People v. Blythe St. G ang, No. LC 020525 (Cal. Super. Ct. Los Angeles County A pr. 7, 
1993) (o rder fo r prelimin ary injuncti on) ; see also Boga, supra no te 20, at 481-83. Ava il ab le 
sources indicate th at th is injunction is currently bei ng appealed. See Respondent's Brief, People 
v. Gonzalez, No. BR 33744 (Cal. A pp. Dep ' t Super. Ct. Los A nge les County fi led Apr. 22, 1994) 
(concerni ng appea l by person convicted of violating Blythe Srreer injunction). 
42 People ex rei. City A ttorney v. Acuna, No. 729322 (Ca l. Super. Ct. San ta C la ra County 
June 28, 1993) (order granting prelimina ry injunction) ; see also Boga, supra no te 20, a t 483 . 
Newspapers report that the A cuna injunction is being appeal ed. See Patricia Jacobus, Oakland 
Goes Ajier Gang with Lawsuir: Nuisance Law Used Against "B Srreet Boys", S.F. CH RON., May 
2 1, 1994, a t A17 (fi nal ed.); David A. Sylveste r, San Jose Bans Gang Members from Area, S.F . 
CtmoN., Apr. I, 1994, a t A23 (fin al ed.). 
43 People ex rei. City A ttorney v. Ava los , No. CV 739089 (Cal. Super. Ct. Santa Clara 
Cou nty Mar. 30, 1994) (orde r gran ting pre liminary inj unction); see also Sylveste r, supra note 42. 
44 City of Norwa lk v. Orange St. Locos, No. VC 016746 (Ca l. Supe r. C t. Los A ngeles County 
Aug. 25 . 1994) (pre liminary injunction); see also Helfand , supra note 17; City Wins an Injunction 
Againsr Vioienr Gang, T HE R ECORD (Los A ngeles), Aug. 26, 1994 , a t A 17 [he rein after Ciry Wins 
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Street did the court accompany its order granting th e antigang injunc-
tion with an opinion anal yzing the legal issues. 45 In th at o pinion , the 
court uphe ld the injunction aga inst challenges based on the freedom 
of associa tion, the right to trave l, freedom of speech , overbreadth , 
vagueness, and the right to privacy. 4 6 At least two peop le have been 
convicted an d ano ther two arres ted for violating the Blythe Street in-
junction,47 and at leas t on e person has been convicted and two othe rs 
arrested under the Acuna injunctio n.48 Significantly, in all of these 
cases the court expanded the permissible scope of antigang injuncti ons 
beyond the limits established in Playboy Gangster Crips and included 
provisio ns specifi cally rejected by Judge Deering. 49 
lnjunCiionJ; Around the U.S .. DALLAS MoRN ING NEws, Aug. 26, 199~, at lJA. The prelim ina ry 
injunction wa s gran ted after the judge had initially den ied the city's request for <l temporary 
rest raining orde r. Judge Rejects Offic ials' Bid to Limit Activities of Gang . L. A. T I'-'IES, Jul y 23. 
19li-l. at B2 (ho me cd.) ; For the Record, L. A . TtM ES, July 26, 1994. at B2 (home ec!.) (co rrect ing 
Judge Rejects Ojjicials' Bid to L imit Activities of Gang, supra) . 
45 People v. Blyth e St. Gang, No. LC 020525, slip op. (Apr. 7, 1993) (statement of decision). 
-Hi hi. at S- 16. In the opin ions, the Blythe Streer court also specifically endorsed th e Los 
Angeles City Attorney 's decis ion ·to proceed aga inst the gang as an unincorporated associat io n. 
/d. at 6-8: see also infra no te 49. 
47 See Tho m Mrozek, Unusual Anri-Gang Injunction Leads to Conviuion of Man for Having 
Pager. L.A . TI MES . Aug. 26, 1993, at Bl (Southland ed.) (reporting that Jessie '·Speedy" Gonza-
lez was se ntenced to 90 days in jail and three yea rs probation for violat ing 8/yrhe Streer injunc-
tio n): Kurt Pitze r, Gang Suspect Gets 45-Day Jail Term, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1993, at B3 (Va lley 
ed .) (reporting that Rene Ca rlos Va ldez was sentenced to 45 days in jail for viobting Blyrhc 
Streer injunction) ; Hu go Martin , Two Face Charges Under Blythe Street Gang Crackdown , L.A. 
TtMEs, Nov. 23. 1993, at B5 (Valley ed.) (reporting that Cuthbert Sum ayah and Ramo n R odrigo 
Aguilera have been charged with viola ting Blythe Srreet injunction). Interesti ngly, one o f the 
alleged gang membe rs convicted for violating the injunction has been arrested three additi o nal 
times fo r violating the injunction. See Chip Johnson, Man Charged Again Under Blyrhe Srreet 
Coun Order, L.A. TIM ES, Jan. 12, 1994, at B6 (Valley ed.) (report ing that Jessie "Speedy '' Gon-
za lez has bee n charged with violating injunction a second time) ; David Colke r, Man Arresred 
Again Under Ban on Gangs, L.A. T IMES, Mar. 25, 1994, a t B3 (Va lley ed.) (reporting tha t Gon-
za lez has been charged with vio lating injunction fo r third and fo urth times). 
48 See Mary A. Ostrom, Gang-Control A ction OK'd, SAN JosE !VIERCURY NEws , June 29, 
1993. at B l ( reportin g tha t two people ar res ted and one person sentenced to 45 da ys in prison 
for violating Awna inj unction). 
49 For example, the court s in Acosta, Blyrhe Street, Acuna , Avalos, a nd Orange Srreer Locos, 
gran ted prohibitions aga inst appearing in public and associating with ot her gang me mbers. See 
infra part II. B.!. In dividual injunctions also contained bans on wearing gang insignia , see infra 
pa rt 1!. 8.3, and cur fews, see infra notes 66-67 and accompanying text. All of these provisions 
were rejected in Playboy Gangster Crips. See supra notes 26-28, infra note 68 a nd accompanying 
text. 
It sho uld a lso be noted tha t in three cases, the city atto rneys did not requ est that the injunc-
t io n be im posed against specific individ uals and instead proceeded against the e ntire ga ng as a n 
unincorporated association. See People v. B lythe St. Gang, No. LC 020525, slip op. at 1 (Ca l. 
Super. Ct. Los A ngeles County A pr. 7, 1993) (order for pre liminary injunction) : Peop le v. Play-
hoy Gangs te r Crips, No. WEC 118860, sli p op. at 2 (Cal. Supe r. Ct. Los A nge les County Dec. 11, 
·! 987) (prel imin ary injunction); see also City of Norwalk v. Orange St. Locos, No. VC 016746, sl ip 
op. at i -2 (Ca l. Super. Ct. Los A ngeles County Aug. 25 , 1994) (pre liminary injunct ion) (proceed-
ing agamst both named defendants and entire gang as unincorporated associa ti on). In those 
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In contrast , the Amaya and "B " Street B oys courts declined to 
iss ue preliminary injunctions against the alleged gang members .so 
Although th e courts relied in part on equitab le considerations, they 
both also cited constitutional grounds. Specifi cally. th e Amaya court 
based its rejec tion on the First and Fourteenth Amendm ents to the 
United States Constitution as well as the Califo rnia constitutional 
right to privacy ,5 1 while the "B " Street B oys co urt ca lled the proposed 
injunction " o verbro ad " and " vague" and found the evide nce re li ed 
upon as the basis fo r th e injunction ' 'constitutio na ll y insu fficie n t."52 
Notably , the rejected injunction te rms were almost iden tical to those 
granted in oth er cases .5 3 
B. Summary of Key lnjun crion Terrns 
This section provid es th e framework fo r the const itu tional analy-· 
s1 s of the a ntigang injunctions by identi fying five types of injunction 
cases. th e po lice m~de the fi na l de ter mi nati on o f whe th er a give n ind ividu al sho uld have been 
subjec ted to an ant igang injunct io n. See inf ra note 15 1 and accom pa nying tex t. 
50 People v. "B .. St. Boys, No. 735405 -4. s lip o p. a t 2 (Ca l. Supe r. Ct . Alamed a Count y Ju ne 
17, 1994) (order de nyin g prelim in ary injunct ion ); People ex rei. Jones v. A maya, No . 71 3223, sli p 
op. a t 4-5 (Ca l. Super. Ct. O range Count y Nov. 10, 1993) (order de nying pre limin ary injunction); 
see also Pa tr icia Jacobus, Judge Th rows O ut Oakland Suit A gainst Street Gang, S.F. Cl·tR ON ., June 
18. 1994, at A19 (fin al ed.); Hannah Nordh aus. City Can 't Prohibit Gang's Mo vement, TH E R E. 
CO RDER (San Francisco) , June 20, 1994, at 6. The Amaya court 's refusal to issue a prelimina ry 
injunction fo llowed its initia l g rant of a tempo rary restraining order. See A nd rea H eiman , In -
juncrion Bars Gang Activiry in City , L.A. TtMES, Jul y 3. 1993, a t B3 (O range Co unty ed. ). Avail -
able sources indica te tha t the rejection o f the Amaya injunct ion is curre nt ly be ing a ppea led . See 
Be rt Elje ra, Judge 's Ruling on Gangs Appealed, L .A. . Ti MES, O ct. 28, 1993, at B4 (Ora nge 
Co unty ed.). 
5 ! People ex rei. Jones v. A maya , No. 713223, slip op. a t 4 (Ca l. Super. Ct. Orange Coun ty 
Nov. 10, 1993) (order denying prel imi nary injunction) . Newspaper accounts report that the 
co urt grounded its decisio n in freedom of association and called the injunction "an ' impe rmissi -
ble invasion of privacy ' under the First A mendment." Pinsky , supra not e 8. H oweve r, thi s la n-
guage does no t appear on the face of the writte n o rder. People ex rei. .Jones v. A maya, No. 
71 3223 , slip op . at 4 (Ca l. Supe r. C t. O range County Nov. 10, 1993) (orde r denyi ng p re lim inary 
injun ction) . 
52 Peopl e v. ·' B" St. Boys , No. 735405- 4, slip o p. a t 2 (Ca l. Super. Ct. Ala meda Coun ty June 
17, 1994) (o rde r de nying pre lim in ary injunction); see also Ma rk I. Pinsky & Sa m Enriquez, 
Tough Orange Coun ty A nti-Gang Law Voided, L.A. TI MES, Aug. 31, 1993, a t B5 (Valley cd.) . 
53 Compare Complai nt fo r Te mpo ra ry Restra in ing O rde r, Pre li minary and Pe rman e nt Jn-
junctio ns to Aba te a Public Nuisa nce a t 7-8, A m aya (No. 71 3223 ) with Peop le ex rei. C ity A t tor-
ney v. Acuna, No . 729322, slip op. at 2 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sant a Cl ara County Jun e 28, 1993) (orde r 
gra nting pre liminary injunction ) and People ex rei. Fl e tch er v. Acosta , No . EC 010205 , sli p op. at 
3-4 (Cal. Supe r. Ct. Los Angeles County Nov. 2, 1992) (orde r gra nting pre limin ary injunction); 
compare also Complaint fo r Injunction and Equitable Reli ef to A ba te a Publ ic Nuisance a t 9-10, 
"B" St. Boys (No. 735405-4) with Peo ple ex rei. City A tto rney v. Ava los , No. C V 739089, slip op. 
at 3-5 (Cal. Super. Ct. Santa Clara County ~1 a r. 30, 1994) and People ex rei. City A ttorney v. 
Acun a, No. 729322, sl ip op. a t 2-5 (Ca l. Supe r. Ct. Santa Cla ra Count y Ju ne 28, 1993) and People 
v. Bly the St. Ga ng, No. LC 020525, sl ip op. a t l- 6 (Ca l. Supe r. Ct . Los Angeles County A pr. 7, 
1993) (o rde r fo r prel imin ary inju nction) . 
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terms found in California antigang injunctions that raise particular 
constitutional problems.54 
1. Restrictions on Associating with Other Gang Members.-The 
antigang injunctions have all included a provision restricting the de-
fendant gang members' associational activities. For example, th e 
Avalos, Acuna, and Acosta injunctions prohibited gang members from 
" stand ing, sitting, walking, driving, gathering or ap pearing anywhere 
in public view" with any other defendan t o r gang member.55 The 
Blythe Street injunction prohibited defendants fro m " congregat[ing] 
with any other member or affiliate of the Blyth e Street Gang for the 
purpose of threa tening o r intimidating others in any public place,"56 
and the Orange Street Locos injunction employed similar language_57 
54 Focus is placed on o nl y five types beca use othe r types of injunction terms are well es tab-
lished as proper subjects for nu isance abate ment. CA L P E~JAL CoDE§ 186.22a (e) (sta ti ng tha t 
firearms owned or possessed by ga ng member cons tituted nuisance) : Miller v. Interla ke Stee l 
Co .. 649 P 2d 922 (Cal. 1982) (holding excess ive noise constituted nuisance); Phillips v. City of 
Pasade na. 162 P.2d 625 (Cal. 1945) (ho lding blocki ng of public stree t constituted nuisance); 
Kafka v. Bozio , 218 P. 753 (Cal. 1923) (holding continuing trespass con stituted nuisance); 
O'Hagen v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 96 Cal. Rptr. 484 (Ct. App. 1971 ) (affirming lowe r 
court 's ho lding that litter ing constituted nuisance); C it y & Count y o f Sa n Francisco v. Burton, 20 
Cal. Rpt r. 378 (Ct. App. 1962) (suggesting disorde rly conduct is nuisance per se); People v. 
Amdur, 267 P.2d 445 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1954) (holding blocking of sidewalk consti-
tuted nuisa nce); Burre ll , supra note 1, at 743-44 (no ting Califo rnia courts have he ld gra ffiti con-
st ituted nuisance). This is consistent with the law of other states, which have held that 
organizations that make excessive noise, e.g., Sherk v. India na Waste Sys. , Inc., 495 N.E.2d 815 
(Ind. Ct. App. 1986); Wade v. Fuller, 365 P.2d 802 (U tah 1961), encourage unde rage drinking 
and the resulting violence, e.g., D ouglas v. Hayes, 144 S.E .2d 756 (Ga. 1965); State v. Cowdrey, 
17 N.W.2d 900 (N.D. 1945); Go rdon v. Sta te , 289 P.2d 396 (Okla. Cri m. App. 1955); Parke r v. 
State, 208 S.W.2d 380 (Tex. Civ. App.), aff 'd, 212 S.W.2d 132 (Tex. 1948), and a ttract people who 
urina te and defecate in public, e.g., Armory Park Neighborhood Ass'n v. Episcopal Com munity 
Servs., 712 P.2d 914 (Ariz. 1985) , constitute public nuisances. 
55 People ex rei. City Attorney v. Avalos. No. CV 739089, sl ip op. at 3 (Cal. Super. C t. Santa 
Clara County Mar. 30, 1994); People ex ref. City A ttorney v. A cuna, No. 729322, slip op. at 2 
(Cal. Super. Ct. Santa Clara County June 28, 1993) (order granting preliminary injunctio n); Peo-
ple ex ref. Fle tche r v. Acosta , No. EC 010205, sli p op. at 3 (Cal. Super. Ct. Los Angeles County 
Nov. 2, 1992) (order gran ting preliminary injunction). In Amaya, the Westminster City Attorney 
requested this sa me provision and had it granted as part of the temporary restra ining order; 
however, the Amaya court eventually rejected it along with the rest o f the preliminary injunc-
tion. People ex ref. Jones v. Amaya , No. 713223, sl ip op. at 4 (Cal. Supe r. Ct. Orange County 
Nov. 10, 1993) (order denying preliminary injunct ion); Er ic Lichtbla et a!., Westm inster Gang 
Gets rhe Word-In Wriring, L. A. TIMES, July 11, 1993, at A 1 (Orange County ed. ). 
56 People v. Blyth e St. Gang, No. LC 020525, slip op. at 4-5 (Ca l. Super. Ct. Los Angeles 
County Apr. 7, 1993) (order for preliminary injunction). 
57 City of Norwa lk v. Orange St. Locos, No. VC 016746, slip op. a t 4 (Cal. Supe r. Ct. Los 
Angeies County Aug. 25, 1994) (prelimin ary injunction) (rest ra in ing defe nda nts and unnamed 
gang members from "[c]ongregating in any public place with any o the r person for the purpose of 
e ngaging in a ny conduct prohibited by this injuncti on"). 
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A clause banning all association with any other gang member was re -
jected in Playboy Gangster Crips. 5s 
2. Prohibitions Against Demanding Entry.-The Avalos and 
Blythe Street injunctions included provisions to deter th e gang's prac-
tice of fo rcing entry into residents' homes to evade arrest by police. 
T he Blythe Street injunction prohibited "demand[ing], or by threat of 
force. ente r[ing] into another's residence,"59 while the Avalos injunc-
tion enjoined defend ants from "[d]emanding entry into another per-
son's residence at any time of the day or night. "6° 
3. Restrictions on Gang Clothing and Hand Signs.-A!though 
severa l cities requested a ban on gang attire and hand signs in th eir 
initial complai nts,61 only the Avalos and Acuna injunctions in San Jose 
ultimately included this type of provision.62 However, those provi-
sions were constructed more narrowly than the generalized bans on 
gang fas hion , regalia, or colors that have raised constitutiona l con-
ce rns in other contexts.63 Specifically, the Avalos and Acuna injunc-
tions prohibited gang members from " [w]earing clothing which bears 
the name or letters" of the specified gangs as well as using the hand 
signs of the specified gangs.64 
58 Compare Complaint for Temporary Restraining Order, and for Prelimin ary and Perma-
ne nt Injunction, to Abate Public Nuisance at 11, Playboy Gangster Crips (No. WEC 118860) 
(requesting provision prohibiting gang members from "associat[ing] with any person who is a 
member of the Playboy Gangster Crips ") with People v. Playboy Gangster Crips, No. WEC 
118860. slip op. at 3 (Cal. Super. Ct. Los Angeles County Dec. 11, 1987) (preliminary injuncti on) 
(omitting that provision); see also Paul Feldman, City Atty. Modifies Plan to Control S treet Gang, 
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1987, § 2, at 3 (home ed.) (reporting that Los Angeles City Attorney was 
no longer ask ing court to bar gang members from associating with one another after court re-
fu sed to grant temporary restraining order). 
5 9 People v. Blythe St. Gang, No. LC 020525, slip op. a t 4 (Cal. Super. Ct. Los Angeles 
County Apr. 7, 1993) (order for preliminary injunction). 
00 People ex rei. City Attorney v. Avalos, No. CV 739089, slip op. at 4 (Cal. Super. Ct. Santa 
Ciara Coun ty Mar. 30, 1994) (order granting preliminary injunction). The Oakland City Attor-
ney unsuccessfully requested this same provision in "B" Street Boys. Co mplaint for Injunction 
and Equitable Relief to Abate a Public Nuisance at 10, "B" St. Boys (No. 735405-4). 
61 Complaint fo r Preliminary and Pe rmanent Injunction to Abate Public Nuisance at 17 , 
Blyrhe St. Gang (No. LC 020525) (requesting ban on gang attire and hand signs) ; Complaint for 
Temporary Restraining Order, and for Preliminary and Permanent Injunction , to Abate Public 
Nuis~mce at 11, Playboy Gangster Crips (No. WEC 118860) (requesting ban o n gang attire o nl y). 
62 People ex rei. City Attorney v. Avalos, No. CV 739089, slip op. at 4-5 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
San ta Clara County Mar. 30, 1994) (order granting preliminary injunction); People ex rei. City 
Attorney v. Acuna, No. 729322, slip op. at 5 (Cal. Super. Ct. Santa Clara County June 28, 1993) 
(order grant ing preliminary injunction); see also Krysten Crawford, Big Deals, Big Suits: Ca lifor-
nia v. Acuna, THE RECORDER (San Francisco), July 29, 1993, at 2. 
63 See, e.g., Burke, supra note 1, at 524 (arguing that school dress codes banning gang colors 
rai se vagueness problems unless ca refully worded). 
54 People ex rei. City Attorney v. Avalos, No. CV 739089, slip op. at 5 (Ca l. Super. Ct. San ta 
Clara Coun ty Mar. 30, 1994) (order granting preliminary injunction); Peopl e ex rei. City Attar-
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4. Restrictions on Local Mov ement.-The antigang injunctions 
imposed two different kinds of restrictions on the movements of gang 
members. The fir st kind of restriction prohibited certain types of 
movements designed to spot or flee from approaching law e nforce- ( 
ment officers. These movements included being on rooftops in non- 1 
emergency situations; climbing trees , walls, or fences; and passing l 
thro ugh tunn e ls or ho les in walls and fences. 65 
The second type of restriction on movement was curfews. Both 
1 the Orange Street Locos and Blythe Street injunctions prohibited de-
1 
fe ndant s under th e age of e ighteen from being in a public place within 
the affected ne ighborhood during the evening.66 Furtherm ore, th e 
Orange Sirecr Locos and Blythe Street injunctions instituted curfews 
that applied to ad ults as well. 67 The City of Los Angeles a lso re-
quested a similar curfew in Playboy Gangster Crips, but Judge Deer-
ing denied the request.6c: 
ncy v. Acuna. No. 72<)322. sli p op. at 5 (Ca l. Super. Ct. Santa Clara County June 28, 1<)93) (on.kr 
granting rreliminary injuncti on); see also Colvin. supra note 6; Crawford. supra not e: 62. 
65 City of Norwalk v. Orange St. Locos. No. VC 0 16746. slip op. at 2 (Cal. Supe r. Ct. Los 
A nge les County Aug. 25 , 1994) (pre liminary injunct ion); People ex rei. City Attorney v. Ava los. 
No. CV 7390b9, sli p op. at 4 (Cal. Super. Ct. Santa Cl ara County Mar. 30, 1994) (order granting 
prel iminary injunction); Peopl e ex rei. City Attorn t;y v. Acuna , No. 729322, slip op. a t 4 -5 (Ca l. 
Supe r. Ct. Santa Clara County June 28, 1993) (order granting preliminary injunction): Peop le v. 
Blythe St. Gang, No. LC 020525, slip op. at 4 (Cal. Super. Ct. Los Angeles County Apr. 7. 1993) 
(order for prelimina ry injunction). A similar provision was reques ted and rejected in ·'B" Srrce1 
Boys. Complaint for Injunction and Equitable Re lief to Abate a Public Nuisance at 10, "B" S1. 
Boys (No. 735405-4). 
66 City of Norwalk v. Orange St. Locos, No. VC 016746, slip op. at 3 (Cal. Super. Ct. Los 
A nge les County Aug. 25, 1994) (preliminary injunction) (restraining juvenile defendants and 
gang members from being in a public place from 10 p.m. to sunrise unl ess "( 1) accompani ed by a 
pa rent o r lega l guardian, or (2) perfo rming an errand directed by a parent o r legal guardia n, or 
(3) go ing to/from a meeting or e ntertainment open to the public, or (4) actively engaged in some 
business, trade, profess io n or occupation which requires such presence"); People v. Blythe St. 
G ang, No. LC 020525, slip op. at 5 (Cal. Super. Ct. Los Angeles County Apr. 7, 1993) (o rder for 
preliminary injunction) (p rohibiting juvenile gang members from being in a 120-block area from 
8 p.m. to 6 a.m. unless carrying identification and proof that he o r s;1e was coming fro m e ither a 
school activity or a job. ). 
67 The Bly1he Street injunction prohibited a ll persons, adults a nd minors alike, fro m be ing in 
a specified two-block area in the hea rt of the neighborhood at any time unless carrying identifi -
ca tion and proof of residency in the area. People v. Blythe St. Gang, No. LC 020525 , slip op. at 
5-6 (Cal. Supe r. Ct. Los Angeles County Apr. 7, 19<)3) (order for preliminary injunction). The 
Orange S1ree1 Locos injunction restrained adults from being in a public place between midnight 
and sunrise un less "( 1) going to/fro m a mee ting or e nterta inment open to the public , o r (2) 
active ly engaged in some business, trade, profession or occupation which requires such pres-
ence." City of Norwalk v. Orange St. Locos, No. VC 016746, slip op. at 3 (Cal. Super. Ct. Los 
Angeles County Aug. 25, 1994) (preliminary injunction). 
68 Compare Complaint for Tempo ra ry Restraining Orde r, and for Prelimin ary an d Perma-
nent Injunction, to Aba te Public Nuisance at 11, Playboy Gangster Crips (No. WEC 118860) wi1h 
i"eople v. Playboy Gangste r Crips. No. WE C I 18860, slip op. at 3 (Cal. Super. C t. Los Angeles 
County Dec. 11, 1987) (p relim inary injunction) ; see also Feldman, Judge Raps . Sllpra note 27; 
Feldman , s11pra note 58. 
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5. Prohibitions Against Annoying or Harassing Residents.-A ll 
)f the injunctions included a clause prohibiting gang members fro m 
1arassing neighborhood residents . The Playboy Gangster Crips in-
unction ordered gang members not to "annoy, harass, intimidate, 
:hreaten or molest" residents ,69 and the Avalos, Acuna, and Acosta 
.njunctions banned gang members from "confronting, intimidating, 
:mnoying, harassing, threatening, challenging, provoking, assaulting 
and/or battering" residents.70 The Orange Street Locos injunct ion re-
strained defendants and gang members from " harassing, intimidating, 
. . . or otherwise threatening the peace or safety of any person." 7 1 
Si milarly , the Blythe Srreet injunction ordered gang members not to 
·' annoy, harass, intimidate , threaten, [or) challenge .. . any person. "72 
In summary, this Comment will consider the constitutionality of 
fi ve types of injunction provisions: restricti ons on associating with 
other gang members, prohibitions against demanding entry, res tric-
ti ons on clothing bearing ga ng insignia, restrictions o n loca l move-
ment, and prohibitions against annoying or harassing resid ents. 
III . TH E ABRIDGMENT oF SuesTANTIVE CoNSTITUTIONAL R IGHTS 
O pponents of the California antigang injunctions have cha llenged 
their constitutionality on the grounds that they infringe on the gang 
members' substantive constitutional rights. 73 This Part considers the 
most significant of these claims. Section A evaluates whether the in-
junctions infringe upon the defendants' right to fre edom of associa-
tion, concluding that street gangs are neither expressive nor intimate 
enough to fall within this constitutional protection. Neverthe less, sec-
69 People v. Playboy G angs te r Crips, No. WE C 118860, slip op. at 3 (Ca l. Supe r. Ct. Los 
A ngeles County Dec. 11 , 1987) (preliminary injunction ). 
70 People ex rei. City Attorney v. Ava los, No. CY 739089, slip op. a t 3-4 (Cal. Supe r. Ct. 
Santa Clara County Mar. 30, 1994) (orde r gra nting preliminary injunction) ; Peopl e ex rei. Ci ty 
Attorney v. Acuna, No . 729322, sli p op. a t 4 (Cal. Su per. C t. Santa Clara County June 28, 1993) 
(orde r gra nting preliminary injunction) ; People ex rei. Fle tcher v. Acosta, No. EC 0 10205, slip 
op. a t 4 (Ca l. Super. Ct. Los Angeles County Nov. 2, 1992) (orde r granting preliminary inju nc-
tion). A similar provision was requested and rejected in "B" Srreer Boys and Amaya . Complaint 
for Injunction and Equitable Relief to Aba te a Public Nuisance at 10, '' B " Sr. Boys (No . 735405-
4): Complain t for Tempo ra ry Restrain ing O rder, Preliminary a nd Permanent Injun ct io ns to 
Abate a Public Nuisance at 8, Amaya (No. 713223). 
71 City of Norwalk v. Orange St. Locos, No. VC 0 16746, slip op. a t 2 (Cal. Supe r. Ct. Los 
Ange les County Aug. 25. 1994) (preliminary injunction). 
72 People v. Blythe St. G ang, No. LC 020525, slip op. at 3 (Ca l. Super. C t. Los Angeles 
Co unty Apr. 7, 1993) (order for preliminary injuncti on). 
73 See supra no tes 46, 51-52 and accompanying text. Injunctio ns, like statutes, a re subject to 
challe nge for infringing upon constitutiona l right s. If an injunctio n 
inhibits protected free expression, unduly burdens or prohibits associational ti es, o r intrudes 
int o protected privacy spheres, it may run afoul of th e [F)irst a nd [Fjourtee nth 
[A )mendments. Obviously a legislat ure ca nnot authorize courts to infringe o n protected 
freedoms via injunctions any more than it ca n affect those rights direct ly through legisla ti on. 
Cheh, supra note 20, at 1406 n.434. 
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tion A finds that law enforcement authorities must be careful to en-
sure that the injunctions are not applied in such a way that they 
constitute guilt by association. Section B then considers gang mem-
bers ' right to freedom of expression , determining that while the 
prohibitions of demanding entry are permissible, the restrictions 
against the wearing of gang clothing probably violate the alleged gang 
members' Firs t Amendment rights. Lastly, section C demonstra tes 
that the constitutional right to travel may not be im pl icated , and even 
if it is implicated, the injunction terms restricting that right will likely 
be found to be reasonable restrictions of th at right. 
A. Freedom of Association 
Even though the Constitution does not expl icitly enumerate a 
right to freedom of association, the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
recognized such a right.74 The Court has referred to freedom of asso-
ciation in two distinct senses: expressive association and intimate asso-
ciation .75 This section begins by evaluating each of these forms of 
fre edom of association and concludes that street gangs are not suffi-
ciently expressive or intimate to warrant such protection. The Court 
has also protected associational rights by prohibiting any finding of 
guilt based on purely associational activity .76 This section ends by 
concluding that antigang injunctions can easily constitute impermissi-
ble guilt by association and that the authoriti es seeking the injunction 
must be careful to avoid this infirmity. 
1. Freedom of Expressive Association-One aspect of the free-
dom of association, referred to by the Court as the freedom of expres-
sive association, protects people's right to act collectively in exercising 
their First Amendment rights.77 In the seminal case of NAACP v. A l-
abama ex rei. Patterson,78 the Court for the first time protected the 
"freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs."79 
The freedom of expressive association was reiterated in Griswold v. 
Connecticut,80 which noted that "freedom of association [is] a peri ph-
74 See. e.g., City of Dallas v. Stangl in, 490 U.S . 19 (1989); New York Stat e Club Ass' n v. City 
of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988); Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rota ry Club, 481 U.S . 537 
( 1987) : Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984); NAACP v. Claibo rn e Hardware 
Co., 458 U.S . 886 (1982); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); United Mine Wo rkers v. Illinois 
Sta te Bar Ass'n , 389 U.S. 217 (1967); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 41 5 (1963); She lton v. Tucker, 
364 U.S . 479 (1960) . 
75 E. g., Roberts, 468 U.S . at 617; Stanglin , 490 U.S. at 24. 
76 E.g., Claiborne Hardware , 458 U.S. at 918-20, 924-26. 
77 See, e.g., Stanglin, 490 U.S. at 24. 
78 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
79 !d. at 460. 
so 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
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era! First Ame ndment right."81 The Griswold Court went on to define 
this right in broad language, stating that " [i]n li ke context , we have 
protected forms of 'association' that are not political in the customary 
sense but pertain to the social, legal, and economic benefit o f the 
members. "82 Consequent ly, courts in the past have inte rpre ted the 
freedom of expressive association expansively, including a wide vari-
e ty of organizations within its boundaries,83 including prison gangs .s4 
More recently, the Court has taken a more restrictive view of the 
kind of associative activi ty that can be considered expressive.85 As the 
Court stated in New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York,'l6 
" ' [t)he close nexus be tween the freedoms of speech and assembly'" 
does not indicate "that in every setting in which individual s exercise 
some discrimi nati on in choosing associates, their se lective process of 
inclusion and exclusion is protected by the Constitution. " 87 More 
pointedly. in Ciry of Dallas v. S tanglin,88 the Court rejected respon -
dents ' claims that an ordinance prohibiting teenagers from being in 
dance halls violated the teenagers ' freedom of express ive association, 
in part because " [t )here is no suggest ion that these patrons ' take posi-
tions on public questions ' or perform any of the other similar activi-
ties" normally associated with expressive association.89 In so holding, 
the Court limited the breadth of expressive association rights, refusing 
to recognize a generalized right of "social association. "90 The Court 
recognized that other courts had often found a right to social associa-
81 !d. at 483. 
82 fd. ; see also Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984) (" [W]e have long 
understood as implicit in the right to engage in activities protected by the Firs t Amendment a 
corresponding right to associate with o thers in pursuit of a wide variety o f political, social, eco-
nomic, educa ti onal. religious, and cultural ends.") . 
83 E.g., Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615 (1971) (stating that freedom of associ -
ation includes right of people to gather in public places for social or politica l purposes); Alad-
din's Castle , Inc. v. City of Mesquite, 630 F.2d 1029, 1041-42 (5th Cir. 1980) (overturning ban o n 
minors in video arcades on basis of right to association), prob. juris. noted , 451 U.S . 981 (1981). 
rev'd on other grounds , 455 U.S. 283 (1982); Sawyer v. Sandstrom, 615 F.2d 31 1, 317 (5th Cir. 
1980) (finding First A mendme nt right of associa tion includes right to locomotio n) ; cf Bykofsk y 
v. Borough o f Middl etown , 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1254 (M.D. Pa. 1975) (ho lding freedom o f move-
ment is protected by substa nti ve due process) (citing Coates, 402 U.S. at 611: Griswold. 381 U.S. 
a t 500 (Harla n, J. , concurring)).aff'd without opinion, 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 
429 U .S . 964 ( 1976). 
84 See Dawson v. Delaware, 112 S. C t. 1093, 1097, 1099 (1992) (holding that abse nt some 
showing of rel evance, admission of evidence of defendant 's prison-gang me mbership in a sen-
tencing hearing vi olated the defendant 's Firs t Amendment rights). 
8 5 E.g., C ity of Dall as v. Stanglin, 490 U .S. 19 (1989); New Yo rk State Club A ss 'n v. City o f 
New York , 487 U.S l, 12 (1988). 
86 487 U .S. I (1988). 
8 7 [d. at 12 (quot ing NAACP v. Alaba ma ex re f. Patterson, 347 U.S. 449, 460 (1958)). 
88 490 U.S. 19 (1 989) . 
89 !d. at 25 (quot1 ng Board o f Directors of Ro tary lnt ' l v. Rot ary Club, 481 U.S. 537. 548 
(1987)) . 
90 !d. 
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tion because of the expansive language in Griswold,91 but it explained 
tha t such a broad reading was unwarranted because "the quoted lan-
guage from Griswold recognizes nothing more than that the right of 
expressive association extends to groups organized to engage in 
speech that does not pertain directly to politics. "92 O ther courts have 
applied this more limited reasoning to hold inapplicable the right to 
freedom of expressive association in cases where the association in 
question did not take positions on political, social, or religious ques-
tions or other activities associated with the First Amendment.93 
These decisions indicate that the gang activity res tricted by these 
injunctions is not protected by the freedom of expressive association. 
Like the social organizatio n in Stanglin, street gangs typically do not 
take positions on public issues. 94 Therefore, as in Sranglin, absent in-
dications that gangs undertake First Amendment activities, courts are 
unlikely to fi nd gangs to be expressive associations 95 
Eve r1 if gangs attempt to gain First Amendment protection by 
taking positions on public issues, they still may be subj ect to regula-
tions limiting their nonexpressive activities. The Court has made it 
clear that no group of persons has the right to associate for wholly 
91 See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text. 
92 Stanglin. 490 U.S. at 25 . 
93 See. e.g. , Lyng v. International Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement 
Workers, 485 U.S. 360,364-69 (1988); Rorary, 481 U.S. at 548; Viei ra v. Presley, 988 F.2d 850, 852 
(8th Cir. 1993); Watson v. Fraterna l Order of Eagles, 915 F.2d 235,244 (6th Cir. 1990); Rathert v. 
Village of Peotone, 903 F.2d 510, 517 (7th Cir.), cerr. denied, 498 U.S. 921 (1990); Swank v. 
Sma rt, 898 F.2d 1247, 1250-52 (7 th Ci r.), cerr. denied, 498 U.S. 853 (1990); Berg v. Commande r, 
Fifth Coast Guard Dist., 810 F. Supp. 703, 7 11 (E.D . Va. 1992), aff'd wirhow opinion, 27 F.3d 562 
(4th Cir. 1994); Bush ex rei. Bush v. Cassel-Cokato Bd. of Educ .. 745 F. Supp. 562,569 (D. Minn. 
1990); Welsh v. Boy Scouts, 742 F. Supp. 1413, 1430-31 (N.D. Ill. 1990); Burrows v. Ohio 1-IIgh 
Sch . Athktic Ass'n , 712 F. Supp. 620, 626 (S.D. Ohio 1988), ajf'd, 891 F.2d 122 (6th Ci r. 1989); 
accord Graham v. Jones, 709 F. Supp. 969, 972 (D. Or. 1989) (holding that traveling in vehicle 
wi th friends and co-workers does not cons titute expressive association); Sunse t Amusement Ct. 
v. Board of Police Comm'rs, 496 P.2d 840, 845-46 (Cal. 1972) (h olding that simple physical activ-
it y or self-amuse ment without some element of com municating or advancing ideas or belie fs is 
not protected by freedom of association), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S . 1121 (1973) ; People v. Ka-
trinak, 185 Cal. Rptr. 869, 874 (Ct. App. 1982) (holding that predominantly commercia lly and 
ente rtainment-oriented en terp rise has no communicative eleme nt and thus is not protected by 
free dom of expressive association). 
94 At recent gang summ its, there we re some ca lls for gangs to take a more active ro le in 
public affai rs. See Lee Bey, Gang Su mrnir Srresses Politics, CHJ. SuN-TIMES, Oct. 21, 1993, at 1 
(reporting that Chicago gang summ it stressed political empowerment); James L. Tyson, Black 
Leaders Cali on Urban Gangs ro !Je "New Fronrier of Civil Riglzrs," CHRISTIAN SCI. MoNITOR, 
Oct. 26, 1993, at 3 (same). However, the primary focus of these summits was to e nd gang- rela ted 
violence. and gang leaders ulti mat ely did no t endorse this call for public act ivism. /d. Bur see 
George Pa paj ohn, A Peek Behind Gang's Talk of Po lirical Acrion, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 2, 1994. news 
sec .. at 1 (Chicagoland final ed.); George Papajohn & John Kass, 21st Century VOTE Giving 
Gangs Tasre of Real Po•ver, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 28, 1994, news sec., at 1 (north sports tina! ed.). 
95 See Boga. supra note 20. at 495-99. Bur see id. at 499-502 (arguing for a broader First 
Amendme nt right to pc:aceabk assembly). 
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illega l aims , and associations engaging in both legal and illega l ac tivi-
ties may still be regulated to the extent that they engage in ill egal 
ac tivit ies.96 The mere existence of some First Amend ment activity 
within an association is insufficient to bring all of its activities within 
th e First Amendment.97 Thus, nonexpressive gang activities such as 
those giving rise to the nuisance would still be regulable. 
Lastly, even if an association is found to be expressive , some in-
fringement on its associational rights may be justifiedY8 In Robens v. 
United Swres Jaycees,99 the Court held that enforcing a sta te law 
against sex discrimination did not unconstitu tiona ll y violate the club 
members' right to freedom of association. 10° Conced ing that the club 
does participate in expressive activity,10 1 the Court nonetheless he ld 
that the law under review was constitutional because it was not a imed 
at the suppression of speech, and it was the leas t restrictive means of 
achieving compelling state inte rests. 102 TI1 e Court furth er reasoned 
that " [t)here is ... no basis in the record for co ncluding that admis-
sion of women as full voting members will impede the organization's 
ab ility to engage in these protected activities or to disseminate its pre-
ferred views. "103 
Simil arly, in Madsen v. Women's Health Cen ter, In c., 104 the Court 
he ld that First Amendment activity may be enjoined so long as the 
injunction "burden[s] no more speech than necessary to serve a signif-
icant government interest. " 105 The Court noted that numerous signifi-
cant government interests were protected by the injunctio n in that 
case. The Court then upheld some provisions of th e injunction as be-
ing sufficiently narrowly tailored to meet the aforementioned stan-
dard, but rejected others as unduly burdensome to speech. 106 The 
Court reasoned that the injunction was not an impermissible limit on 
the First Amendment freedom of associa tion because "petitioners are 
not enjoined from associating with others or from joining with them to 
exp ress a particular viewpoint. The freedom of association protected 
96 Madsen v. Women's He alth Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2530 (1994); see also Donald T. 
Kramer , An notation, The Supreme Court and the First Amendment Right of Association. 33 L. 
Ed. 2d 865, 895 -98 (1973). 
97 New York Sta te Club Ass'n v. City of New York. 487 U.S 1, 12 (1 988). 
9~ ivladsen, l 14 S. Ct. at 2525-30; Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (19fi4); 
Buck ley•v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976); NAACP v. A labama ex rei. Pa tterso n, 357 U.S. 449, 460 -
61 (1958). 
99 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
J 00 /d. at 623. 
101 !d. a t 626. 
102 !d. at 623-27. 
103 !d. at 627; see also Board of Directo rs of Rotary lnt'l v. Rota ry Club, 481 U.S. 537, 548 
(19fi7) (noting that a res triction did not require Rotary Clubs to abandon their chosen goa ls). 
104 114 S. Ct. 25 16 (1994). 
105 !d. at 2525 . 
1 Ofl !d. at 2526-30. 
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by the First Amendment does not extend to joining with others for th e 
purpose of depriving third parties of their lawful rights." 107 
Thus, even if gangs constitute expressive associations, courts may 
find th at antigang injunctions are justifiable infringements of ga ngs' 
freedom of expressive association. Like the statute in Roberts and 
some of the injunction provisions in Madsen, antigang injunctions 
serve signi ficant, if not compelling, gove rnment interests by aba ting 
the th reat to public health and safe ty caused by public nuisances .10 S 
Moreover, as in Roberts and Madsen, the regulation, being limited in 
geographic scope , does not " impede the organization 's ability to en-
gage in . . . protected activities or to disseminate its prefe rred vie ws" 
because gang members can still conduct their expressive activities 
elsewhe re. 109 There fore , even if courts find that gangs are express ive 
associations, courts may still issue injunctions if they are sufficie ntly 
tailored . 
2. Freedom of Intimate Association-It is also unlike ly that 
gangs will be protected by the freedom of intimate association, 1 w 
which protects those "deep attachments and commitments to the nec-
essarily few other individuals with whom one shares not only a special 
community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively 
persona l aspects of one 's life." 111 Determining whether a given asso-
ciation falls within these parameters has proven to be a difficult task. 
As the Supreme Court noted in Board of Directors of Rotary Interna-
tional v. R otary Club of Duarte: 
We have not attempted to mark the precise boundaries of this type of 
constitutional protection .. . . But .. . we observed that "[ d]etermining 
the limits of state authority over an individual's freedom to enter into a 
particular association ... unavoidably entails a careful assessment of 
where that relationship's objective characteristics locate it on a spectrum 
107 !d. at 2530. 
!08 See. e. g. , Leonardson v. City of E. La nsing, 896 F.2d 190, 198 (6th Cir. 1990) (recogn izi ng 
city had compelling interes t in abating public nuisance caused by large, semiannual student 
party). 
109 Roberrs, 468 U.S. at 627; see also Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2524 n.2, 2530. 
110 Co urts ha ve generall y trea ted the freedom o f intimate associa tio n as a Firs t A men d men t 
right. E.g .. D awson v. Delaware, 112 S. Ct. 1093, 1097, 1099 (1992); City of Dallas v. Stanglin , 
490 U.S. 19, 25 (1 989). Arguably, freedom of association ca n be understood as an aspec t o f 
liberty pro tec ted by the Due Process Clauses as we ll. E.g., Roberrs, 468 U.S. at 620; S ranglin . 490 
U .S. at 28 (St eve ns. J., concurring). Howe ver , given the na rrow vis ion o f du e process li be rty 
taken by the Court in Bowe rs v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) , it is unlikely that a due process 
approach wil l provide any more protec tion fo r intimate associations than will the Firs t A me nd-
ment ap proach. See Willi am P. Marsh all, Discriminarion and rhe Righi of Associarion , 8 1 Nw. U. 
L. REV. 68 . 81 (1986) . 
111 Board of Direc to rs of Rotary 1nt ' l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 545 (1987) (qu oting Rob · 
errs, 468 U.S. a t 619-20) . See generally Kenne th L. Karst, Th e Freedom of ln rim are Associarion , 
89 YALE L.J. 624 (1990). 
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from the most intimate to the most att enuated of pe rsona l 
attachments. "112 
The Court has considered several factors in evaluating whether a 
elationship falls within the right of intimate association. Specifically, 
he Court has looked at "size , purpose, selectivity [in beginning and 
naintaining the relationship], and whether others are excluded from 
:ritical aspects of the relationship. " 11 3 Applying this analysis, the 
:::ourt in Rotary concluded that since the clubs numbered in size from 
wenty to nine hundred, recruiting and turnover were constant, and 
;lub activities were open to no nmem bers, the clubs " [did] not suggest 
he kind of private or personal relationship to which we have accorded 
Jrotection under the First Amendment." 11-l 
Viewing antigang injunctions with those considerations in mind , 
:::riminal street gangs, like th e clubs in Rotary, clearly do not constitute 
intimate associations.11 5 Like Rotary C lubs , the gangs involved in 
these particular cases are relatively large, ranging in size from thirty-
eight to four hundred fifty members. 116 Moreover, as in Rotary , the 
fact that gangs engage in constant recruitm ent activity 11 7 and open 
their activities to nonmembers 1 Js belies any claim that street gangs 
112 Rorary, 481 U.S. at 545 (quoting Roberr:;, 468 U.S. a t 620) (a lteration to quotation in 
original ). 
113 !d. at 546 (quoting R oberls, 468 U.S. at 620). 
114 !d. at 546-47. 
115 Boga, supra note 20, at 495-99. 
116 Pa ul Feldman, Court Rejects Ci1y Allorney's Bid ro Curb Westside Gang's Movemems, L.A. 
TIMES, Nov. 6, 1987, § 2, a t 1 (home ed.) (numbering Playboy Gangster Crips at more than 200 
members) ; Ciry Wins Injuncrion, supra note 44 (numbering Orange Street Locos at 60 members); 
Jim H. Zamora, Valley Is Model in Ami-Gang Effor£, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1993, a t B2 (Va lley 
ed. ) (numbering Blythe Stree t ga ng at 450 mem bers). Size es timates for the other gangs were 
unavailable, although the substantial numbe r o f na med defendants and unnamed " Does" sug-
gests unnamed gangs of substantial size. See Complaint for Injunction and Equita ble Relief to 
Abate a Public Nuisance at 1, People v. "B" St. Boys, No. 735405-4 (Cal. Super. Ct. Los Angeles 
County filed May 18, 1994) (18 defendants, 50 unnamed Does, and entire gang as unincorpo-
ra ted association) ; People ex rei. City Attorney v. Avalos, No. CV 739089. sli p op. at 1 (Ca l. 
Super. Ct. Santa Clara County Mar. 30, 1994) (24 defendants and 100 unnamed Does); Com-
plaint for Temporary Rest raining Order, Preliminary and Permanent Inju nctions to A bate a 
Public Nuisance at 1, People ex rei. Jones v. Amaya, No. 713223 (Cal. Super. Ct. Orange Co un ty 
filed June 30, 1993) (59 defendants and 100 unnamed Does); Complain t for Tempo rary Re-
straining Order, Prelimina ry Injunctio n and Permanent Injuncti on to Abate a Pu blic Nuisance at 
2-3, People ex rei. City Attorney v. Acuna, No. 729322 (Cal. Super. Ct. Santa Cla ra County f1l ed 
Feb. 26, 1993) (38 defendants and 100 unnamed Does); People ex rei. Fletcher v. Acosta, No. EC 
010205 , slip op. at 1-2 (Cal. Super. Ct. Los A nge les County No v. 2, 1992) (order granting prelimi-
nary injunction ) (88 defendants and 100 unnamed Does). 
117 People v. Blythe St. Gang, No. LC 020525 , slip op. at 7 (Cal. Supe r. Ct. Los Angeles 
Co unty Apr. 7, 1993) (sta tement of decision) (noting Blythe St ree t gang members share common 
purpose to recruit new membe rs); R EINER, supra note 1, at 22 (cit ing th at mos t gangs ·'probably 
e ngage in some form of active recruitme nt " ). 
118 Re iner, supra note 1, at 41-44 (noting that nonmembers Me allowed to part icipate in gang 
ac tivi ties). 
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constitute an intimate association. Nor is the existence of intimate 
relationships between certain gang members sufficient to render the 
entire gang an intimate association worthy of constitutional protec-
tion.119 As the Court held in New York State Club A ss 'n v. City of 
New York, 120 " [i]t may well be that a considerable amount of private 
or intimate association occurs in such a setting, ... but that fact alone 
does not affo rd the entity as a wh ole any constitutional immunity." 12 t 
Therefore, courts should reject defendants' argument that an injunc-
tion would inhibit intimate associations. 
3. Guilt by Association.-Law enforcement authorities must e n-
sure th at antigang injunctions are not implemented in a way that co n-
stitutes guilt by association. Although people do not have the right to 
associate for the purpose of pursuing wh olly unlawful aims, 122 associa-
tions with both legal and illegal goals present a different case. 12 J T h e 
Supreme Court has made it clear that members of an association with 
both legal and illegal goals cannot be held liable for th e associa ti o n's 
illegal activities unless they ac tively participated in those illegal ac-
tio ns with the specific intent of furth ering the association's illegal 
a ims.124 
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. 125 is illustrative . In Clai-
borne Hardware, black citizens were boycotting white merchants to 
t t9 See, e.g., Memorandum of Points and Authorities of Amicus Curi ae ACLU in Opposition 
to Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 16, Blythe St. Gang (No. LC 020525) (filed Mar. 10, 
1993) (arguing that injunction violates fre edom of association by preventing siblings from sit ting 
toget her on their own front porch) . 
120 487 U.S. 1 (1988). 
12 1 !d. at 12 (ci tati on omitted); see also Madsen v. Women's Health Ct r., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 25 16, 
2530 ( 1994 ); cf Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78 (1 984) (holding that existence of First 
Amend ment protections of freedom of associa tion and expression do not preclude justifiable 
govern ment regulatio n). 
122 Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 229 (1 961); In re Alberto R. (People v. Albe rto R.) , 
1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 348, 353 -54 & n.5 (Ct. App. 1991). 
123 See Kramer, supra note 96, at 895. 
124 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886,919-20 & n.55 (1982) ; Rizzo v. G oode. 
423 U.S. 362, 373-87 (1976); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 186 (1972); Ke yishian v. Board of 
Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966); see also 16A A M. J uR. 2o 
Constiwtional Law§ 539 (1979) (noting "[i]t is now clear from a number of the Supreme Co urt 's 
late r decisions involving freedom of association that one may not be pr~sumed guil ty because of 
the company he keeps") ; Kramer, supra no te 96, at 906 (collec ting cases on gui lt by associatio n). 
However, "[ i)t should be noted tha t a distaste fo r guilt by associa tion has not a lways bee n a 
hallmark of Supreme Court decisions." /d. For example , in Adler v. Board of Ed uc. , 342 U .S. 
485 (1952) , the Court upheld the dismissa l of a teacher, reasoning that "[f] rom time immemorial , 
one's reputation has been determined in part by the company he keeps." !d. at 493; cj Kore-
ma tsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214. 218 (1944) (approving deprivation of libe rti es because of 
ancestry withou t any showing of individual partici pation in illegal activity); id. at 237-38 (Mur-
phy, J. , disse nting) (noting that inte rnment was based only o n general izations about the e ntire 
group). 
125 458 U.S. 886 (1982). 
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protest perceived racial injustice. 126 The merchants sought and were 
granted an injunction against 146 individuals to prevent them from 
co ntinuing their boycott. 127 Seventy-nine of these individua ls were 
enjoined becaus e they regularly attended NAACP mee tings, and 
twenty-two others we re enjoined because the black hats they wore 
identified them as protesters. 128 
"The Court dissolved this injunction because it constituted civil li a-
bility on the basis o f associatio nal activity. 129 The Court reaso ned that 
"[t]he First Amendment ... restricts the ability of th e State to impose 
li ability on an individual solely because of his association with an-
other."1 30 The Court continued: 
Civil lia bi lity ma y not be imposed m ere ly because an individual be-
longed to a group, some members of which committed ac ts o f vio le nce. 
Fo r liability to be imposed by reason of association alon e . it is necessary 
to establish that the group itse lf possessed unlawful goa ls and that th e 
individua l he ld a specific intent to further those illegal aims. In this sen-
sitive fi eld, the Sta te may not employ means tha t broadly sti tk funda -
me ntal personal liberties when the end can be mo re narrowly 
ach ieved. 131 
The Court proceeded to quote Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. 
Meadowmoor Dairies, lnc.: 132 " 'Still it is of prime importance that no 
constitutional freedom, least of all the guarantees of the Bill o f Rights, 
be defeated by insubstantial findings of fact screening reality.' " 13 3 
The Court then concluded that attendance at NAACP mee tings and 
the wearing of black hats were insufficient to prove the specific intent 
to further an unlawful aim embraced by the group and thus were an 
insufficient factual predicate for the injunction. 134 
The refore , a person may be subject to an antigang injunction 
without constituting guilt by association only if the facts sufficiently 
establish that that person actively participated in the gang's illegal ac-
tivities and had the specific intent to do so. Accordingly , cities should 
be careful to enjoin only those persons whose level of participation 
and specific intent justify their being subjected to the injunction. In 
addition, courts should carefully scrutinize the methods used to de ter-
mine who is subj ected to the injunctions to ensure tha t the facts es tab-
li sh these elements. 
!26 !d. at 889. 908. 
127 !d. at 889. 
128 !d. at 897. 
!29 !d. at 920. 
130 !d. at 918-19. 
l3 1 !d. at 920 (quo tations and footnote omitted). 
!32 312 U.S. 287 (1941 ). 
i 33 Claibome !iard•vare, 458 U.S. at 924 (quoting Milk Wagon Drivers , 3 12 U.S. a t 293). 
134 !d. at 924 -26. 
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The record of People ex rel. City Attorney v. Acuna 135 demon-
strates the risk of impermissible guilt by association involved in deter-
mining against whom an antigang injunction should be imposed. In 
Acuna, th e San Jose City Attorney looked to several factors in decid-
ing whether a pe rson was a gang member and should be subjected to 
the antigang injunction: (1) whether the person had admitted to mem-
bership in a specific gang; (2) whether the person bore a tattoo, wore 
gang clothing, or was observed using gang hand signs; (3) whether the 
person was named as a gang member by two or more other members 
of the gang: ( 4) whether the person was an active participant in a 
criminal street gang crime; (5) whether the person was identified as a 
gang member by a reli able informant; or (6) whether the person had 
been observed associating with identified gang members two or more 
times .13n 
The factors used in Acuna offer little protection against unconsti-
tutional guilt by association. For example, subjecting a person to an 
injunction based on that person's being identified as a gang member 
by himself or by another gang member is suspect. 137 As one expert 
noted, "Be skeptical about what you hear, even if you get it directiy 
from gang members. (Gang members have lots of games to play-
with themselves , with each other, with police or anybody else in au-
thority, and with anybody who can possibly be 'impressed.')" 138 
Moreover, the mere fact that a person identifies himself or herse lf 
as a gang member does little to establish that his or her level of partic-
ipation is active enough to support legal liability.139 Gang experts 
agree that there are different levels of participation in gangs,140 and a 
135 No. 729322 (Cal. Super. Ct. Santa Clara County June 28, 1993). 
136 Defendants ' Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 4 n.5, People 
ex rei. City Attorney v. Acuna, No. 729322 (Cal. Super. Ct. Santa Clara County filed May 28, 
1993). 1l1e risk of impermiss ible guilt by association is heightened by the fact that one of the 
primary sources of thi s type of information on gang members is so-called field identification or 
field inquiry (FI) ca rds, in which law enforce ment officers note the circumstances of thei r con-
tacts with suspected gang members. However, FI cards contain little information about what 
circumstances led to the person's identification as a gang member and are often screened by 
officers who lack the proper experience a nd training to ensure the cards' accuracy. See id. at 4; 
REINER, supra note 1, at 141. Thus. FI cards often lack the details necessary to determine the 
al leged ga ng member's leve l of participation in gang acti vities . 
137 Cf ln re Lincoln J. (People v. Lincoln J. ), 272 Cal. Rptr. 852, 855-56 (Ct. App. 1990) 
(holding that previous identification of self as a gang member to a police gang expert held insuf-
ficient to es tablish gang membership under Cal ifornia's Street Terrorism Enforcement and Pro-
tection Act). 
138 Joan Moore . Gangs and Gang Violence: What We Know and What We Don't, in G ANG 
VIOLENCE PREVENTION 23, 23 (Alfredo Gonzalez eta!. eds., 1990). 
139 See NAACP v. Claiborn e Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 920 & n.55 (1982); Lincoln 1., 272 
Ca l. Rptr. at 855-56. 
14 0 Ruth Horowitz , Sociological Perspec!ives on Gangs: Conflicting Definirions and Concepts, 
in G ANGS IN A~1ERICA, supra note 1, at 37, 45; REINER, supra note 1, at 40-44; Burrell , supra 
note 1, at 750 & nn.45-46; Moore, supra note 138, at 28-31. In fact, the District Attorney of Los 
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pe rson may identify himself of herself with a gang solely for recogni-
ti on, protection, or social purposes and never actively participate in 
the gang's illegal activities. 141 Given that the Constitution requires a 
pe rson's active participation with the specific inte nt of furthering an 
organization 's illegal aims before that person can be e njoined because 
of his o r her membership in that organization, 142 a person's self-identi-
fi ca tio n as a gang member without more is insufficient to subject that 
person to an antigang injunction. 
A person's wearing of gang clothing or a gang-related tattoo is 
also insuffici ent to justify subjecting that person to an antigang injunc-
tion. 143 T he fact that nonmembers often experiment with gang cloth-
in gl-l4 and inactive gang members still bear gang ta ttoos 145 m akes 
bas ing an injunction on such indicia problema ti c. F urthermore , the 
Supreme Court held in Claiborne Hardware 146 that an ind ividual's 
wearing o f apparel associated with an organization was constitution-
ally insufficie nt to establish the level of participa ti on in that organiza-
tion 's illega l aims necessary for an injunction. 147 G iven that ho lding, 
courts should not find that having a gang tattoo or wearing gang clo th-
ing is sufficient to subject a person to an antigang injunction. 
Nor should a person 's association with known gang members con-
clusively indicate that that person is an active participant in the gang's 
criminal activities sufficient to justify subjecting tha t pe rson to an anti-
gang injunction. 148 Just as attending NAACP meetings was held insuf-
ficient to justify the injunction in Claiborne Hardware, lawfully 
associating with identified gang members should be held insufficient 
to form the basis for an antigang injunction .149 
Angeles County has noted that its database includes a large number of inactive ga ng me mbers. 
R E INE R, supra note I , at 111. Unless local law enforcement veriti es that a person is still an active 
me mber of the gang, using such databases to de te rmine who should be subj ect to antigang in-
junctions presents se rious risks of guilt by past associatio n a nd would be unconstitutional. 
141 Burrell, supra note I , a t 750 & n.48; Boga, supra note 20, at 486-89. 
142 See Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 920 & n.55. 
143 See Burrell, supra note 1, at 754-55 (arguing that dressing like a gang me mbe r a nd ta ttoo-
ing a re no t conclusive of gang membership) ; Schultz. supra note 7, at 730 (questioning the use of 
cl o thing combined with skin color as a basis fo r concluding that a pe rson is a gang me mber). 
144 REINER, supra note 1, at 41. 
145 Burrell, supra note 1, a t 755 n.65 . 
146 458 U.S. 886 (1982). 
147 ld. at 924-26. 
148 See id. 
149 See id. This is particularly true beca use the known ga ng membe rs' c rimina l acts were 
more tha n likely committed for the perpetrators' own benefit ra ther than for the benefit of the 
gang as a whole. See REI NER, supra note I , at 55, 58; Burrell , supra note I , at 750; Moore, supra 
no te 5, at 38-39. The refo re , it is far from clear that even if a person associa tes with known gang 
members. those other gang members' criminal activities should be attributed to th a t person. See 
Claiborne Hard•wlre, 458 U.S. at 926-32. 
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1l1e risk of guilt by association is particularly acut e in those cases 
whe re gangs are enjoined as unincorporated associations. 150 In cases 
where named defe nd ants have been enjoined, a judge in th eory has 
re viewed the factual sufficiency of the case against each defend ant. 
Howeve r, in unincorporated-association cases, judges decide only 
wh ether the entire gang should be enjoined, whil e th e decision 
whether a particular person should be subjected to the injunction li es 
entire ly with experts in local police departments without any further 
judicial review. 15 1 Thus in unincorporated-association cases, a person 
may face contempt-of-court charges without ever having h is or he r 
case subjected to an independent, judicial dete rmina tio n o f whether 
th e po lice's determination of gang membership was correct. 15 2 
T his is not to say that gang members can neve r be subjected to 
antigang injunctions without violating the Constitution's prohibiti on 
of gu ilt by associa ti on. The problem is ens uring that such inj uncti ons 
are o nl y applied to persons who mee t the active participa tion and spe-
cifi c intent requi rements mandated by th e Const itution . Law enforce-
ment authoriti es sho uld take two steps to ensure tha t ant igang 
injunctions are applied to alleged gang members in a const itutional 
manner. First , in deciding who should be subj ected to such an injunc-
tion , auth orities should employ a definition of gang membership that 
includes active participation and specific intent requirements. 
A lthough definin g gang membership has proven to be a difficult 
task, t sJ many states have already developed such definitions in their 
antigang statutes that have passed constitutional muster. For exam-
ple, California 's Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention 
(ST EP) Act154 contains a definition of gang membership that includes 
both active participation and intent requirements155 which, as courts 
t 50 See supra note 49. 
15 1 See Jim H . Zamora , Police Begin Serving Cou rt Order ro Gang, L. A. TIMES. May 9, 1993 , 
a t B3 (Valley ed .). This reliance on police experts' opinions is problematic since courts have held 
such o pinions a lone a re insufficient to establish a gang's pa rticipa tion in illega l activity. S ee In re 
Lincoln J . (People v. Lincoln J. ), 272 Cal. R ptr. 852, 855-57 (Ct. App. 1990); In re Le la nd D. 
(People v. Leland D.), 272 Cal. Rptr. 709, 713 -14 (Ct. App. 1990). 
152 ·n1 is is pa rticular ly troublesome since under the collate ral bar rule, by the tim e a vio lat ion 
reaches the contempt-o f-court s tage, the defendant is barred from contes ting e ithe r the const itu-
tiona lity or the factual sufficiency of the injuncti on and is restricted only to the issues of whe ther 
th e court had the jurisd iction to issue the injunction and whether the de fe ndant kn owingly vio-
la ted it. See inf ra note 280 and accompanying tex t. 
153 Robert A . Destro, Gangs and Civil Rights , in G ANGS, supra note 1, at 277 , 280; 13urrell, 
supra no te I , a t 748-50; Horowitz , supra note 140, at 43. 
15-+ CAL PENAL CoDE§§ 186.21-1 86.28 (Wes t Supp. 1994). 
155 1l1e STEP Act defi nes a gang member as " [a]ny person who actively parti cipates in any 
criminal stree t gang with knowledge tha t its members e ngage in o r have e ngaged in a patte rn of 
cri mi nal ga ng act ivity, a nd who wi ll full y promotes, furth e rs, o r assists !n any fe lo nio us crimi na l 
cond uct by members of that gang, " § 186.22(a), where a " pattern of criminal gang activity " is 
de fin ed as th e commission , attempt , o r solicit at ion of se ven spec ified o ffenses , § 186.22(e) . 
Oth e r states have adopted simi la r defin itio ns. See, e.g. , GA . CODE ANN.§ 16-15-3 ( 1992); IowA 
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have held, avoids guilt-by-association problems.156 Cities pursuing an-
tigang injunctions can similarly avoid guilt-by-association concerns by 
incorporating these standards and only enjoining persons whose con-
duct satisfies these defmitions. 1 5 7 
Tne second step law enforcement should take to avoid guilt-by-
association problems is to eschew enjoining gangs as unincorporated 
associations and allow courts to review the factual sufficiency of the 
claim against each defendant. 158 Moreover, to make these protections 
effective, courts should scrutinize the factual suftlciency of the case 
against each individual defendant to make sure that the defendant's 
conduct satistled the requirements imposed by the definition of gang 
membership. 159 
B. Freedom of Expression 
The First Amendment of the Constitution states, "Congress shall 
make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or 
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances." 160 The Supreme Court has 
encapsulated the freedoms of speech and the press into the term 
"freedom of expression." 161 This section analyzes whether antigang 
injunctions violate gang members' freedom of expression, focusing on 
the prohibitions against demanding entry and restrictions on wearing 
gang insignia and using hand signs. 162 This analysis reveals that since 
demanding entry constitutes speech representing a clear and present 
CooE ANN. § 723A.1 (West 1993); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:1404 (West 1992); MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 609.229 (West Supp. 1994); Mo. REv. STAT. § 578.421 (West Supp. 1994); NEv. REv. 
STAT. ANN. § 193.168 (Michie 1992); Act of Dec. 10, 1993, §§ 133, 141, 1993 Wis. LAws 98 (to be 
codified at Wis. STAT. §§ 939.22(9), 941.38( l )(b)). 
156 People v. Green, 278 Cal. Rptr. 140, 145-46 (Ct. App. 1991); In re Alberto R. (People v. 
Alberto R.), 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 348, 354-55 (Ct. App. 1991); People v. Gamez, 286 Cal. Rptr. 894, 
902 (Ct. App. 1991). 
157 If judges require municipalities to make a constitutionally sufficient evidentiary showing 
for each gang member, just as is required for criminal sanctions such as the STEP Act. it is 
possible that antigang injunctions will lose much of their attractiveness. However, cities m::~y 
remain interested in antigang injunctions nonetheless since easier evidentiary burdens are only 
one of many reasons that law enforcement agencies may prefer civil sanctions to criminal ones. 
See Cheh, supra note 20, at 1345-48. 
158 See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware. 458 U.S. 886, 920 & n.55, 924-25 (1982). 
159 See Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 9-27, Peo-
ple ex rei. City Attorney v. Acuna, No. 729322 (Cal. Super. Ct. Santa Clara County filed May 28. 
1993). 
160 U.S. CoNST. amend. I. 
161 See, e.g., Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937). 
162 First Amendment concerns raised by limitations on gang members' ability to associate 
with one another have already been addressed in the discussion on freedom of expressive associ-
ation. See supra part III.A.l. First Amendment concerns regarding the injunction provisions 
ordering defendants not to annoy or harass residents will be addressed in the discussion concern-
ing overbreadth. See infra part !V.B. 
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danger, it is not protected by the First Amendment. However, this 
analysis al so indicates that the wearing of gang clothing is protected 
by the First Amendment and that th e injunction terms restricting gang 
attire will be found to violate the gang membe rs' freedom of 
expressiOn. 
1. Prohibitions Agaim·r Demanding Entry.-The injunction pro-
vtstons th at prohibit gang members from demanding entry into resi-
dents' homes constitute res trictions on the a lleged gang members' 
pure speech and thus arc subj ect to the most exacting scrutiny. 16 3 The 
standard of review for restrictions of pure speech turns on whether th e 
res triction is content-based or content-neutral. 104 Content-based re-
strictions must be " narrowly drawn to serve a compe lling state inter-
es t" in order to be found constitutional. 165 Content-neutral 
restrictions arc subj ected to less ri gorous standards. 166 To de termine 
whe ther a regulation is content-based or content-neutral, courts look 
first to whether the government has adopted the res triction without 
reference to the content of the regulated speech. 167 
163 Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1 988) . The First Amendme nt provides the grea tes t protec-
ti o n for pure speech , i. e., the spok en and writt en word. Ex pressive conduct rece ives a lesser 
d egree of protec tion. See infra notes 174-84 and accompanying text. 
164 Defenda nts and the ir amici have argued that antigang injunctions constitute prior re -
stra ints and should be subjec t to an eve n higher degree of scru tiny. Me mora ndum of Points and 
Autho rities in Opposition to Motion for Prelimin ary Injunction at 27-29, People ex ref. Jones v. 
Amaya, No. 713223 (Cal. Super. Ct. Orange Coun ty filed Aug. 19, 1993); Defendants' Opposi-
tion to Plaintiff 's Motio n fo r Preliminary Injunction at 44-46, Awna (No. 729322) (filed May 28, 
1993); Memorandum of Points and Au thorities o f A micus Curiae ACLU in Opposi tio n to Mo-
tion for Preliminary Injunctio n at 14-16, Peopl e v. Blythe St. Gang, No. LC 020525 (Cal. Super. 
Ct. Los Ange les County fil ed Mar. 10, 1993). However, the Court in Madsen v. Wome n's Health 
Ct r., Inc. , 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994), he ld that " [n)o t a ll injunctions which may incide ntally affect 
express ion ... a re ' prior rest raints ,' " particularly whe re the injunction was based o n the defend-
ants' prior unlawful conduct and where the injunct ion did not prevent the defendants from ex-
press ing their message in other ways. !d. at 2524 n.2. 
165 Barry, 485 U .S. at 321; Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass 'n , 460 U.S. 37, 45 
( 1983). In practice, subjec ting a regulatio n to thi s level of sc rutiny has been tantamou nt to find-
ing it unconstitutional. See LAURE;-.JCE H. TRI BE, AMERI CAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw § 12-2, a t 
790 -92, § 12-8, a t 832-33, 836 -37 (2d ed. 1988). 
166 If a rest rictio n is con tent-neutra l and the foru m in question is a public fo rum such as a city 
stree t, Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 480 (1988), the standa rd of review de pe nds o n whether the 
res triction is an o rdinance or an injuncti on. Cont e nt-neutral ordinances may be held valid as a 
reasonable res triction on the time, place , or manner of speec h so long as they serve a significant 
government interest and leave open adequate al ternative channels of commu nicatio n. Clark v. 
Com munity for C reative Nonvio len ce, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984); see also Ward v. R ock Against 
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); Perry Educ. A ss'n, 460 U.S. at 45. Conte nt-neutra l injunction s 
run greater risks of censorship and disc riminatory application than ordinances. Consequently , 
injunctions must "burden no more speech than necessary to se rve a significant government inter-
est " in order to be constitutional. Madsen . 11 4 S. Ct. a t 2525. 
167 Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2523; Ward , 49! U.S. at 791. The Court in Madsen rejected the 
argument that a ll injunctio ns are content-base d because they necessarily apply only to certain 
people. The Court reasoned that it was that gro up of people's pas t actions that led to the ir being 
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However, the Court has defined certain categories of speech to 
be unprotected by the First Amendment and has permitted govern-
ments to regulate those categories in a content-based manner. 16s 
Words that pose a clear and present danger constitute one category o f 
unprotected speech. 169 Under the clear and present danger tes t, 
speech that advocates the use of force or crime can be regulated if it is 
directed at inciting imminent lawless action and is likely to produce 
such action. 170 The threat of illegal action must be truly imminent to 
satisfy the clear and present danger test; advocacy of illegal action a t 
an indefinite time in the future is not sufficient. 171 
Since the prohibitions against demanding entry re fer on the ir face 
to the content of the regulated speech, they are clearly content-base d 
restrictions. However, the injunctions prohibit such demands because 
gang members often evade arrest by forcing their way into people 's 
homes.172 Such demands are directed at inciting the imminent lawless 
action of evading arrest and are likely to produce such acti on. There-
fo re , the speech these injunction terms restrict does pose a clear and 
present danger and can be regulated without violating the Fi rst 
A mendment. 
2. R estrictions on Gang Clothing and Hand Signs.-In contrast, 
the antigang injunction terms prohibiting the wearing of gang clothing 
and the use of gang hand signs probably violate the gang members ' 
First Amendment rights. As noted earlier, the Supreme Court has 
held that regulations of pure speech, unless they restrict only catego-
ries of unprotected speech, must pass the most exacting scrutiny to be 
held constitutional.l 73 However, the Court has generally allowed the 
government greater latitude in restricting expressive conduct than it 
has in restricting the written or spoken wordY4 A s the Court stated 
e njoined , not the court's hostility to the content of their protest. Any restriction on their speech 
was " incidental" to their message. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2523-24. 
168 E.g. , Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1 942). Although governments can 
regulate th ese catego ries of speech in a content-based manner, there remain lim itations to the 
manner in which they regulate them. See R.A.Y . v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2543-47 
(1 992) (holding cities canno t selectively regulate speech based on hostility o r favoritism towards 
message even if speech is unprotected). 
169 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U .S. 444 (1969). The other catego ries o f unprotected speech 
include fighting words, obscenity, libe l, Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572, and defamation , Beauhar-
nais v. Illinois, 345 U .S. 250 (1952). 
1 70 Brandenburg , 395 U .S. at 447; Dennis v. United Stat es, 341 U.S . 494 (1 951) . 
17 1 Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973); see also Watts v. United Sta tes, 394 U .S. 705 
(1 969) (requiring government to prove a true "threat" to the life of the President fo r violation of 
statute). 
172 See supra part !1.8.2. 
173 See supra ;JOles 163-67 and accompanying text. 
174 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989). 
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in United Stmes v. O 'Brien, 175 " We cannot accept the view that an ap-
parentl y limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' wheneve r 
th e person engaging in th e conduct intends thereby to express an 
ide a. " 1711 Similarly , the Court reasoned in City of Dallas v. Stanglin: 177 
"' [F)recdom of speech" means more than simply the right to ta lk and to 
write. It is possible to hnd some kernel of expression in almost eve ry 
activity a person under takes-for example , walking down th e street or 
mee ting one 's fri ends at a shopping mall-but such a ke rne l is not sufti-
cient to bring the acti vi ty within the protection of the First 
Ame ndment. 178 
To de termine whether conduct is sufficiently express ive to fail 
within the First A mendmen t's protection, the Co urt applies the two-
part test first ar ticulated in Spence v. Washington. 179 Under that test 
the Court evaluates whether " an intent to convey a particularized 
message was present' ' and whe the r " the likelihood was grea t that the 
message would be unde rstood by those who viewed it. " 180 If th e con -
duct res tri cted by the regul a tion is found to be express ive under 
Spence and the regulation takes the form of an ordinance, the stan-
da rd of rev iew turns on whether the regul ation is related to the sup-
pression of speech. 1s1 If related to the suppression of speech , th e 
regulati on will be subjected to the same scrutiny as pure speech. 182 If 
unrelated to the suppression of speech, the less stringent standard an-
no unced in United States v. O 'Brien183 applies.184 
175 39 1 U.S. 367 (1968). 
176 !d. a t 376. 
177 490 U.S. 19 (1989). 
178 !d. at 25. 
179 418 U.S. 405 (1974); see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U .S. 397, 404 (1 989) (rei tera ting Spence 
tes t). 
180 Spence, 418 U.S. a t 410-11. 
181 Johnson. 491 U.S. at 403. 
182 !d. For a description of the level of scrutiny for pure speech, see supra notes 163-67 and 
accompanying text. 
183 391 u.s. 367 (1968). 
184 l ohman . 491 U.S. at 403 ; cf JeffreyS. Trachtman, Note, Pornography, Padlocks, and Prior 
Res1rain1s: Th e Conslillllional Limils of lize Nuisance Power, 58 N.Y.U . L. REv. 1478, 1513- 18 
(1983) (arguing th at O 'B rien should be applied to public nuisance injunctions aga inst purveyo rs 
o f obscenity) . It is a rguable that in th e Court in Madsen established the prope r stand ard of Firs t 
Amendment review for injunct io ns regardless if the injunction provisions restri cted pure speech 
or expressive cond uct and that O'Brien does not apply at a ll to injunctions. The anti-abortion 
pro tests that gave rise to lYfadsen clearly involved the core of the First Amendment, a nd the fact 
th at the Court discussed the applicability of time-space-manne r doctrine clea rly indicates that 
the Court regarded the enj oined activities as pure speech. However, it is unlikely that the Court 
would conside r a ll acti viti es restr icted by injunctions to be pure speech because otherwise any 
enjoined party cou ld auto;natical ly challenge the injunction on First Amendme nt gro unds a nd 
invoke the more rigorous st andard provide d in Madsen. There fo re , courts are likely to cont inue 
io ioliow the Johnson fram ewo rk with injunctions, applyi ng Spence as a threshold requirem ent of 
express iveness, evaluating whethe r the regulat ion was related to the sup press ion o f speech , and 
applying Madsen if the reg ula tion was related to suppressing speech. 
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It is unclear whether the wearing of symbolic attire such as gang 
insigni a should be analyzed as pure speech or expressive conduct. 1S5 
In the pre-Spence case of Tinker v. Des JV!oines Independent Commu-
nity School District, 186 for example, three public school students were 
suspended for wearing black armbands to protest American involve-
ment in Vietnam.187 Noting that " the wearing of armbands in the cir-
cumstances of this case" was "closely akin to 'pure speech,' " 188 the 
Court invalidated the school's policy of banning such armbands as an 
unjustified infringement upon free speech. 18lJ Consequently , some 
courts have reasoned that the right to control one's appearance is pro-
tected by the First Amendment. 190 However, other courts have dis-
agreed, holding that one's personal appearance is not su ffic ientl y 
expressive to receive First Amendment protection. 191 The Suprem e 
Court has declined to resolve the split in authority, denying certiorari 
in numerous cases that presented the issue. 192 
185 See TRIBE , supra note 165. § 12-8, at 825-32 (no ting the indeterminacy of the spc:ec h/con -
duct di stinction). 
I 86 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
187 !d. at 504. 
188 !d. at 505. 
189 !d. at 514; see also U nited States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. I, 16 (1989) (Marsha ll , J .. dissent-
ing) (stating that what one wears is protected by the right to free expression); Cohen v. Califor-
nia , 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (holding that wearing a sign on the back o.f a jacket is protected by th e 
First Amendment); Sch acht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970) (holding that wearing military 
uniforms is protected by the First Ame ndment). Other cases have sugges ted that the right to 
control o ne 's appearance is based on the liberty assurance of the Due Process Clause. E.g., 
Zel le r v. D o negal Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ ., 517 F.2d 600, 605 (3d Ci r. 1975) : Breen v. Kahl. 419 
F.2d 1034, 1036 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970); Braxton v. Board o f Public 
Instruction, 303 F. Supp. 958, 959 (M.D. Fla. 1969); see also Kell ey v. Johnson , 425 U.S. 238, 244 
(1976) (assuming without deciding that personal appearance falls within libe rty of Fourteenth 
Amendment and noting lack of guidance provided by precedents); id. at 249 (Powe ll , J. , concur-
ring) (finding no implication of majority opinion as to whether personal appearance falls within 
liberty of the Fourteenth Amendment); id. at 251 (Marshall. J., di ssen ting) (arguing substan ti ve 
due process protects against regulation of what ci ti zens may o r may not wear). 
190 E.g., Kelley, 425 U.S. at 251 n.2 (Marshall , J. , dissenting): Jeglin ex rei. Jeglin v. Sa n Jacin to 
Unified Sch. Dist., 827 F. Supp. 1459, 1461 (C.D . Ca l. 1993): Alabama & Coushatta Tribes v. 
Trustees of Big Shady Indep. Sch. Dist. , 817 F. Supp. 1319, 1334 (E.D. Tex. 1993). rem anded 
without opinion , 20 F.3d 469 (5th Cir. 1994): Church v. Board of Educ. , 339 F. Supp. 538 (E.D. 
Mich. 1972); see also Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 128 1 (1st Cir. 1970) (recogniz ing there may 
be an element of expression in one 's appea rance); Breen, 419 F.2d at 1036 (reaso ning appear-
ance may be within penumbra of First Am endment ); John D. Ingram & Elle n R. Domph, Th~ 
Right to Govern One's Personal Appearance, 6 OKLA. CtTY U. L. R Ev. 339, 343 & n. l2 (1981) 
(a rguing that better reasoned cases recognize a const ituti onal right to govern o ne's pe rso nal 
appearance). 
191 See, e.g., Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069 (8th Cir. 1971). See generally W.E. Shi pley, 
A nnota tion, Validity of Regulation by Pttblic School Authorities as to Clo1hes or Personal Ap· 
pearance of Pupils , 14 A.L.R.3d 1201 (1967 & Supp. 1993) (co llecting right to appeara nce cases 
that arose in a school co ntext). 
192 See Ingram & D o mph, supra note 190, at 345-46 & n.25 (li sting twelve cases concerning 
students ' ri ght to control their hair le ngth in which cert iora ri was denied); see also Holsappie v. 
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Regardless of whether one's appearance should be considered 
pure speech or expressive conduct, the regulation of the wearing of 
gang insignia and the use of hand signs should be found unconstitu -
tional. If the wearing of gang attire and the use of hand signs are 
found to be pure speech, it will almost certainly be considered a con-
tent-based restriction, since they clearly refer to the content of the 
speech. 193 Moreover, in Cohen v. California, 194 th e Court held that 
arresting a person for wearing a message on his clothing constituted a 
content-based restriction and was invalid. 195 Since injunct ion provi-
sions prohibiting gang attire and hand signs simil arly pena lize the 
wea ring of messages, like the statute in Cohen , they should be consid-
ered content-based and presumptively inva lid. T nerefore, unless the 
speech restricted by the regulation is determined to fall withi n one of 
the categories of speech unprotected by the First Amendm ent , it will 
be subjected to strict scrutiny and almost certainl y be fo und 
unconstitutiona\. 196 
It is unlikely that courts will find that gang ins ign ia and hand 
signs fa ll into one of the categories of unprotected speech .197 First, 
gang insignia and hand signs probably do not constitute fightin g 
words. 198 Fighting words are words of slight moral va lue which "by 
Woods, 500 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. ) (per curiam), cert. denied, 41 9 U.S. 901 (1974). Some courts have 
interpreted the Supreme Court's re fusal to address the issue as an indicat ion th at the issue is no t 
one of constitu tional magnitude. R oyer v. Board of Educ .. 365 N.E.2d 889, 891 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1977); cf Fagan v. National Cash R egis ter Co., 481 F.2d 1115, 111 9 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (reasoning in 
sex discrimination case that hai r length does not present a federal ques tion ); Massie v. Henry, 
455 F.2d 779, 786 n.6 (4th Cir. 1972) (Boreman, J ., dissenting) (reasoning that Supreme Court 's 
refusal to grant cert iorari on the issue indicates lack of importance). 
The disagreement on the issue has unsurpri singly spawned extensive commentary. See, e.g., 
ingram & Oomph, supra note 190; Lynda M. Grandinet: i, Note , Twenty -Five Years Later: 
Schools and School Districts-Discipline of Students-Commiuee May Compel a "Proper Hair-
cut" as Part of Mode of Dress, 25 NEw ENG. L. R Ev. 215 (1990). For a list of 10 oth e r such 
commentaries, see John Dingess, Note, Kelley v. Johnson: A Crew Cur Approach to Liberty, 10 
Sw. U. L. R Ev. 137, 142 n.45 (1978). 
193 See supra note 167 and accompanying text. 
194 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
195 /d. at 18, 26. 
196 !d. at 24; see also supra note 165 and accompanying tex t. Even if the res trictions on gang 
attire and hand signs are regarded as content-neutral, they sti ll are unlikely to pass constit utional 
scruti ny. A lthough such restrictions do serve significant government interests. see supra note 108 
and accompanying text , given the broad scope of the injunctions a cour t could easi ly fin d that 
th ey burden no more speech than necessary, Madsen v. Women's Hea lth O r. , Inc ., 114 S. Ct. 
2516, 2528-30 (1 994) (holding that injunction terms affec ting private property, banning a ll 
''images obse rvable ," and prohibiting protesters from approaching othe rs burdened more speech 
th an necessary). 
197 See supra notes 168-71 and accompan ying tex t. Two of the ca tegories of unprotected 
sreech, obscenity and li be l, are not implicated and wiil not be discussed. 
193 Cha plinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568. 572 (1942). Note tha t the fi ghting words 
doctrine has not been used to uphold a regulation since Fein er v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951) , 
and commentators have begun to question its vitality, see, e.g., Mu rphy, supra note 22, at 1351. 
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their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate 
breach of the peace ." 199 To be fighting words, it is not enough that 
they make listeners angry ; they must actually incite others to vio-
lence ,200 and unless an onlooker could reasonably interpret the words 
as a d irect personal insult or an invitation to exchange fi sticuffs , they 
can not be considered fighting words .201 Although gang att ire and 
hand signs do at times provoke violence,2°2 they do not invariably 
have th is effect, and onlookers appear to understand th at their princi-
pal purpose is to express affiliation and not to incite violence _2o3 
Tr1erefore, courts will probably conclude that gang clothing and hand 
signs do not constitute fighting words. 
Similar ly, co urts are unlikely to hold that gang clothing and hand 
signs const itute speech that represents a clear and present dange r. As 
noted earlier, speech represents a clear and present dange r if it is di-
rected at inciting imminent lawless action and is like ly to produce such 
action;204 in addition, the lawless action advocated must be more than 
a general ized threat of future action.205 Since gang membe rs wear 
gang clothing and use hand signs primarily to indicate a ffiliati on and 
not to incite violence,2°6 and the clothing and hand signs are at wo rst a 
generalized threat of action rather than a specific incitement to com-
mit violence ,207 they should not be regarded as speech that represents 
However , th e Court has never formally ove rruled the fi ghting words doct ri ne, a nd language in 
recent opin ions indicates that the doctrine is still applica ble . See Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2529 
(suggesti ng that injunction provision wo uld have been valid if pro tes te rs ' speech had consti tuted 
fi ghting words); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul , 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2547 (1992) (sugges ting that hate -
speech stat u te banning a ll fi ghting words might be constitutional); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U .S. 
397,409 (1989) (discuss ing applicability of fi ghting words doctrine); see also id. at 430-31 (Rehn -
quist. C.J ., dissenting) (express ing willingness to apply fi ghting words doctrine). 
199 Chaplinsky, 3 15 U.S. at 572. 
200 Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (holding speech must be '' shown like ly to 
prod uce a clear and present danger of a se rious substantive ev il that rises far above public incon-
venie nce . annoyance, o r unrest" to constitute fighting words). 
201 Johnson , 491 U.S. a t 409; cf Butts v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 436 F.2d 728 (5 th C ir. 1971) 
(hold ing tha t wearing arm bands does not constitute fighting words). 
202 See Burke, supra note l, at 519; Murphy, supra note 22, a t 1352 & n.1 93. 
203 St'e Murphy, sup ra no te 22, a t 1329-30, 1351; Glen Justice, The Uniform of Peace!: A Dress 
Code in Long Beach Could Inspire Other Sch ools that Fear Gang Violence, L.A. Ti ~IES, Feb. 17. 
1994, a t E1 (home ed. ) (quo ting th e Executive Directo r of the National Associat io n of Eleme n-
tary School Principals as qu estioning whether regulating attire addresses vioience): see aiso supra 
notes 139- 41 and accompanying text. In fact, any suggesti on that wearing ga ng attire necessari ly 
provokes vio le nce is belied by the fact that nongang members often wear ga ng attire . See REI -
N ER, supra note I , a t 41 (reporting that pre-ga ng children begi n expe rim en ti ng with gang attire 
and symbols as early as the second grade); see also sup ra no tes 143-45 and accom panying tex t. 
204 See supra note 170 a nd acco mpanying text. 
205 See supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
206 See supra notes 139-4 1 and accompanying text. 
207 See Bu rk e, supra note I , a t 520; Murphy, supra note 22, at 1330, 1351. Again , any sugges-
t io n th a t wearing ga ng attire necessaril y provokes violence is be lied by the fact tha t non-ga ng 
membe rs wear gang a ttire. See supra notes 143-45 and accom pa nying text. 
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a clear and presen t danger. Thus, if the wearing of gang clothing and 
the use of hand signs are treated as pure speech, they sho uld not be 
regarded as unprotected speech , and antigang injunction provisions 
restricting the wearing of gang clothing and the use of hand signs 
should be regarded as presumptively invalid. 
Courts will reach the same conclusion even if the wearing of gang 
insignia and the use of hand signs are an alyzed as express ive cond uct 
rath er than pure speech. As an initial matter, courts should ho ld that 
the \vearing of gang attire and the use of hand signs a re suffic ientl y 
expressive under the Spence test to be protected by the First A menc!-
ment,208 because gang clothing and hand signs probably send a partic-
u larized message of affiliati on likely to be understood by peo pl e 
obse rving them.209 Thus , the wea ring of gang insignia and the usc of 
gang hand signs are likely to be sufficiently expressive to fall wi thin 
the ambit o f the First Amendment. 
F urthermore, courts wi ll likely find that the prohibition of ga ng 
clothing and hand signs in antigang injunctions are related to the sup-
pression of speech and thus are presumptively invalid. In Texas v. 
Johnson,210 the Court conside red whether a statute prohibiting fl ag 
burning was related to th e suppression of speech.211 The State 
claimed th at one of the purposes of the statute was to prevent 
breaches of the peace. The Court he ld that since the fla g burning it-
se lf was insufficient to constitute a breach of the peace, the only way 
the State's asserted interest was implicated was by focusing on the 
impact the flag burning had on the audience.21 2 However, in focusing 
on the like ly communicative impact of the conduct , the inte rest be-
came related to the suppression of speech, subjecting the restrictio n to 
strict scrutiny.213 
Similarly, antigang injunctions that prohibit the wearing of gang 
clothing and the use of hand signs should be deemed related to the 
suppression of speech and subjected to strict scrutiny. Just as the fla g 
burning by itself did not constitute a breach of the peace in Johnson, 
the wearing of gang clothing and the use of hand signs by themse lves 
do not harm anyone directly and do not pose a sufficient threat to th e 
public health , safety, or morals to constitute a public nuisance. As in 
208 See supra not es 179-80 and accompanying text. 
209 Burke. supra note J. at 516 (noting that gang clothing clearly sa tisfies the fir s t prong of th e 
S/;ence test and arguably satisiies the second prong as well); see also Betts v. McCaughtry , 827 F. 
Supp. 1400, 1407-08 (W.O. Wis. 1993) (hold ing that clo th ing choices are expressive conduct 
withi n the Sp ence test; upholdir;g regulation of clo thing cho ices in pr ison o n o the r gro unds) , 
aff'd IVi!lrout opinion. 19 F.3d 21 (7 th Ci r. 1994). 
21 0 491 U.S . 397 (1989). 
211 !d. at 407-09. 
212 !d. at 408. 
2i 3 !d. at 408- 09 . 411-1 2; see also R.A.V. v. C ity of St. Paul , 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2549 (1 9Y2 ); Boos 
v. Barry, 482 U.S . 312, 321 (1988) . 
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Johnson, this lack of direct impact on the public reveals that the rea! 
interest behind the regulation is the impact that the prohibited activity 
will have on the surrounding community. Therefore, as in Johnson, 
courts are likely to conclude that this interest is related to the suppres-
sion of speech. Since gang clothing and hand signs do not fall within a 
category of unprotected speech,214 injunction provisions restricting the 
wearing of gang clothing and the use of hand signs should be found to 
violate the First Amendment.2 15 
C. Right to Travel 
Antigang injunctions should not be found to be unconstitutional 
restrictions on gang members ' right to travel. The existence of a right 
to travel has been acknowledged at least since Shapiro v. Tlz omp-
son.216 While the Court has held th a t the right to travel includes both 
interstate and international travel ,217 the Court has declined to de ter-
mine whe ther this right extends to intrastate travel,2 1S and the circuits 
have split over the issue.219 
Even if the right to travel includes the right to intrastate travel, 
like most constitutional rights , it is subj ect to reasonable limitation.no 
Accordingly, courts have upheld te mporary curfews and other restric-
21 4 See supra notes 197-207 and accompanying text. 
215 But see Charles Mount, Judge Upholds Ban on Gang Insignias , CHI. TR!B. , Sept. 27 , 1994, 
metro northwest sec., at 3 (northwest sports final ed. ) (reporting that judge uph e ld ordinance 
banning gang insignia and hand signs against First Amendment challenge). Oth e r cases ha ve 
upheld restrictions on gang attire in the rest ri cted environments of priso ns and schools where 
greater limits on First Amendment rights are allowed. E.g., Betts , 827 F. Supp. at 1407-08 
(prison); Olesen v. Board of Educ. of Sch. Dist. 228, 676 F. Supp. 820, 822 (N.D. Ill. 1987) 
(school). 
216 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); See also Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250. 254 
& n.7 (1974). The Court has declined to specify the textual basis for this right. Shapiro, 394 U .S. 
a t 630-3 1; see also Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255, 258 -70 (3d Cir. 1990) (reviewing tex tual 
bases for right to travel). 
217 E.g., Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 629-31 (interstate travel); Aptheker v. Secretary of Stale, 378 
U.S. 500, 505-06 (1964) (international travel). 
218 Memorial Hasp., 415 U.S. at 255-56. 
219 Compare Lwz, 899 F.2d at 268-69 (holding that substan ti ve due process protects th e right 
to "move freely about one's neighborhood o r town") and King v. New Rochelle Mun. Hous. 
Auth., 442 F.2d 646, 648 (2d Cir. 1971) ("It would be meaningless to describe the right to trave l 
between states as a fundame ntal precept of persona l libe rty and not to acknowledge a correla-
tive constitutional right to travel within a state. ") . cert. denied, 404 U.S. 863 (l97 l) with Wardwell 
v. Board of Educ., 529 F.2d 625, 627 (6th Cir. 1976) (rejecting extension of ri ght to t ravel to 
intrastate trave l) . See generally Tracy Maclin , The Decline of the Right to Locomotion: The 
Fo!lrth Amendment on the Streets , 75 CoR :--J ELL L. REv. 1258, 1260-64 ( l990) (reviewing cases 
discussing right to intrastate trave l). Regarding California law, see In re White, 158 Cal. Rptr. 
562, 567 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) ("We conclude that the right to intrastate travel (wh ich includes 
intramunicipal travel) is a basic human right protected by the Un ited States and Ca liforn ia Con -
stitutions. Such a right is implicit in the concept of a democratic socie ty and is one of the attrib-
utes of personal libe rty under common law."). 
2 20 See LlltZ, 899 F.2d at 269-70. 
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tions on movement during times of emergency.22 1 Conversely, a re-
striction that, in light of the asserted governmenta l interests, 
unreasonably infringes upon an individual's freedom of movement is 
not justified. 222 
In Lutz v. City of York, 223 the Third Circuit considered the consti-
tutionality of an ordinance outlawing "cruising. "2 2 4 The court first 
concluded that the right to travel does encompass the right to travel 
intrastate, basing the right in substantive due process.225 However, 
the court then eschewed the strict-scrutiny test traditionally applied to 
substantive due process cases, fashioning instead a standard of review 
similar to that employed in reviewing time, place , and manne r restric-
tions of free speech.226 Because the ordinance se rved a significant 
governmental interest, was limited in geographic scope, and allowed 
ample alternative routes to travel about the town , th e court upheld 
the ordinance's constitutionality as a reasonabl e restriction on that 
right to travel.227 
If the right to travel is found not to include the right to travel 
intrastate, then the antigang injunctions' restrictions on local move-
ment pose no constitutional problems. However, even if the right to 
travel is found to include the right to travel intrastate , the injunctions' 
restrictions on local movement, like the ordinance in Lutz, should be 
held to constitute a reasonable restriction on that right. As in Lutz, 
the restriction on local travel in question does serve the significant 
governmental interest of abating public nuisances. 228 The injunctions, 
like the ordinance in Lutz, are also limited in geographic scope. And 
2 21 E.g .. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 8 1, 95, 98-99 (1943) (holding wartime curfew 
fo r Japanese-Americans was reasonable); Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488. 492-95 (5th Cir. 1993) 
(holding juvenile curfew legitimate restriction of freedom of moveme nt) . cert. denied, 114 S. C t. 
2134 (1994); Lutz , 899 F.2d at 269-70 (holding cruising ban was a reasonable restric tion on time, 
place , and manner of right to travel) ; United States v. Chalk, 441 F.2d 1277, 1283 (4th Cir. 1971) 
(holding curfew following student riots was reasonable), cert. denied , 404 U.S. 943 (1971 ) ; In re 
Pedro Q. (People v. Pedro Q.), 257 Cal. Rptr. 821 , 823 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (no ting in dicta that 
we ll-tail ored geographic probation restrictions on travel are co'lstitutional). Fo r a discussion o f 
the constitutio nality of juvenile curfews, see Note , Juvenile Curfew Ordinances and the ConstiiLI-
tion , 76 MtcH. L. R Ev. 109 (1977); see also id. at 113 n.6 (li sting othe r such comme ntary). For a 
more theoretical treatment, see Note, Juvenile Curfews and Gang Violen ce: Exiled on Alain 
Streer, 107 1-L-\RV. L. R Ev. 1693 (1994). 
2 22 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,225-26 (1944) (Robert s, J .. di ssenting); People 
v. Co ntinola , 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 225, 228-29 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct . 1993) ( reversing convic-
ti ons for violating curfew following Rodney King verdicts because prohibiting "me re prese nce" 
o n the street was not a reasonable restriction); cf Whire, 158 Cal. Rptr. a t 566 (fmding probation 
term that prohibited being in a designated area anytime day or night too harsh and oppress ive) . 
2 23 899 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1990). 
2 2 4 !d. at 256. 
225 !d. at 268. 
226 !d. at 269; see aiso supra note 166. 
2 27 Lwz, 899 F.2d at 270. 
2 2 8 See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
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lastly, since the injunctions only impose a limited curfew and prohibit 
climbing trees, standing on rooftops, passing through walls , and other 
limited act ivities,229 the restrictions still allow the enjoined parties 
myriad routes to trave l a round the area. Therefore , even if a right to 
intrastate tr avel is found, it is likely that the restrictions imposed by 
the antigang injunctions, like the ordinance in Lutz, will be found to 
be constitutionally permissible re strictions on the right to travel in 
li ght of the circumstances.230 
Thus, except for the provisions restricting the wearing of gang in-
signia and the use of hand signs, antigang injunctions do no t appear to 
violate defendants ' substantive constitutional rights. They do not in-
fringe on the defendants' freedom of expressive or intimate associa-
tion. Furthermore, the pro hibitions against demanding entry 
probably fa ll within a category held to be unprotected by the freedom 
of expression. Lastly, gang members' constitutional right to trave l 
might not be implica ted, and even if it is , its infringeme nt is just ified 
by the significance o f the governmental interests in restricting it and 
the limited scope of the restriction. However, courts should scrutinize 
th e evide nce about each and every defe ndant in order to avo id any 
guilt-by-association problems, being careful to apply a standard that 
requires that the defendants have the specific intent and the level o f 
participation in the gang's nuisance creating activities required by the 
Consti tution. 
IV. Yom FOR VAGUENEss AND OvERBREADTH 
In addition to the possibility that the antigang injunctions violate 
the alleged gang members' substantive constitutional rights, defe nd-
ants and their amici have consistently challenged antigang injunctions 
as void for vagueness and as overbroad infringements on First 
Amendment rights, and the courts that have reviewed antigang in-
junctions' constitutionality have taken diametrically opposed positions 
on overbreadth and vagueness issues.23 1 This Part will first analyze 
229 See supra part II. B.4. 
230 The Lu1z cou rt 's app lication of time-place-manner doctrine to the right to tra vel is novel. 
H owever , even if courts do not follow th e Lutz court 's application of thi s doctr ine , they wi ll 
like ly fashion a similar test of a restriction's reasona bleness and will like ly uphold the regulat ion. 
See supra notes 98 -1 07 and accompanying text. 
23 1 Memorandum of Poi nts and Authori ti es in Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Injunc-
tion at 24-27, People ex rei. Jones v. Amaya, No. 713223 (Cal. Super. Ct. Orange Coun ty f·iJ ed 
Aug. 19, 1993); Supplemental Brief of Amicus Curiae ACLU in Oppositi on to Request fo r Pre-
liminary Injunctio n at 4-5, 7-8, People v. B lythe St. Gang, No. LC 020525 (Ca l. Supe r. Ct. Los 
Angeles County fil ed Mar. 26, 1993); Me morandum o f Points and Authorities of Amicus Curiae 
ACLU in Opposition to Motion fo r Prelimina ry Injunctio n a t 18-22, Blythe S1. Gang (No. LC 
020525) (filed Ma r. 10, 1993) ; D efend ants' Opposi tion to Plaintiff's Motion fo r Prelimi nary In-
junction at 39-49, People ex rei. Ci ty Attorney v. Acuna, No. 729322 (Ca l. Supe r. Ct. Santa Clara 
County file d Ma y 28, 1993); see supra no tes 46, 52 and accompanying te xt. 
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vvhether certain categori es of antigang injunction terms are void for 
vagueness and will then discuss whether these types of terms are over-
broad and thus infringements of the alleged gang members' constitu-
tional rights. Since the Court and commentators view these doctrines 
as closely related,232 the vagueness and overbreadth issues will be di s-
cussed together. 
The provisions that prohibit demanding entry, res trict local 
movement, and rest rict the wearing of gang insignia and th e use of 
hand signs, while raising other constitutional questi ons, do no t suffe r i 
from lack of definiteness and satisfy the vagueness requirements of l 
the Due Process Clause.233 The preceding analysis has also already \
1
_
1 
indicated that overbread th analysis is inappropriate fo r those provi-
sions since demanding entry is not protected by the First Amendment, 
the res trict ions in gang attire and hand signs are facia lly invalid under \ 
the Firs t Ame ndment, and the right to travel does not implicate th e 
First A mendment at alJ.234 Therefore , this section will focus on the 
provisions limiti ng defendants' association with other gang members 
and prohibiting defendants from annoying or harassing reside nts. 
A. Restrictions on Associating with Other Gang Members 
CD1e antigang injunctions' restrictions on associating with other 
gang membe rs pose serious vagueness and overbreadth concerns. 
Under the void-for-vagueness doctrine, the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment requires that statutes and injunctions be suf-
ficiently specific so that people have notice of what conduct is prohib-
ited .235 To survive a vagueness challenge, a restriction must be 
sufficiently definite that a person of ordinary intelligence can under-
232 See, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 n.8 (1 983); Keyishian v. Board o f Regents , 
385 U.S. 589, 609 (1967); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S . 415, 433 (1963). 
233 Commentators ha ve argued that what consti tutes gang regalia can be ha rd to define and 
tha t a general ized ban on gang regali a would thus be vo id for vagueness. E. g., Burke, sup ra note 
1, at 524-25; James A. Maloney, Comment, Constitutional Prob lems Surrounding the Implem en -
tation of ''Ami- Gang" Regulations in the Public Schools, 75 MARO. L. R Ev . 179, 187 (1991 ). 
However, clea r specification of what clo thing constitutes ga ng rega li a can cure these vagueness 
co ncerns. See Murphy, supra note 22, at 1356; Mount. supra note 215. Since the Avalos a nd 
Awna inj unctions li mit themse lves to attire bearing the gang's name or initi als, see supra part 
ll. B.J, th ey ofk r clearer standards for determining what is p roh ibi ted by the inj unc tion than the 
situation discussed by these commentators, and the argume nts lose their force. 
234 Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 , 453 (1939); Schmidt v. Lessard , 414 U .S. 473, 476 
(1974); Inte rn atio nal Longshoremen's Ass 'n, Local1291 v. Phil adelphia Marin e Trade A ss'n , 389 
U.S. 64 , 74 -76 (1967); see Cheh, supra no te 20, at 1406 n.434. The void- fo r-vague ness challenge 
is par ti cular ly im portant in the case o f antigang injunctions because it is one of th e few constitu-
tio nal claims that is not precluded at th e co nte mpt of court stage by the co ll ate ral ba r rule . See 
infra note 280 and acco mpanying text. 
235 See supra parts !ll.B.1 -2. III.C; see aiso United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739.745 (1967) 
(stating tha t overbreadth doctri ne only applies to the First Amendment). 8111 see A ptheker v. 
Secretary of State . 378 U.S. 500. 505 (1 964) (apply ing overbreadth doct rine to right to trave l). 
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stand what is prohibited.236 The restriction must also provide criteria 
specific enough to discourage arbitrary enforcement. 237 These terms 
need not be defined with mathematical precision; reasonable certainty 
is sufficient to satisfy the mandates of due process.Z38 
Historically, antigang measures have been particularly vulnerable 
to vagueness attacks on both notice and arbitrary e nforcement 
grounds. In Lanzetta v. New Jers ey ,23 9 for example , the Court consid-
e red a statute stating that "[a]ny person ... known to be a m ember of 
any gang consisting of two or more persons, who has been convicted 
at least three times of being a disorderl y pe rson, or who has been 
co nvi cted of any crime ... is declared to be a gangste r" and was pun-
ishable by fin e or imprisonment. 2 40 Th e Court he ld that the phrase 
.. consisting of two or more persons" was insufficient to defin e the 
te rm "gang."241 Therefore, the Court held th a t the statute was void 
for vagueness because it failed to gi ve suffi cient notice o f what activity 
was prohibited and reversed the defendant's conviction.2 42 
The absence of a definition of gang membership also ra ises 
problems of arbitrary enforcement.243 As noted earlier, law enforce-
ment officials and scholars have been un able to formulate uniform cri-
te ria for determining gang membership.244 In the absence of such 
clear criteria, judicial officers are not provided with any specific stan-
dards for determining when a violation of the injunctions has 
occurred. 245 
Thus, unless the provisions in antigang injunctions prohibiting de-
fendants from associating with other gang members are carefully 
worded, they may be vulnerable to vagueness challenges. For exam-
236 Ko /ender, 461 U.S. at 357-61; Lan zetta, 306 U.S. at 453. 
237 Kolender, 461 U .S. at 360-61; Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S . 156, 170-7 1 
( 1972). 
238 See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 491 (1957). 
239 306 U.S. 451 (1939). 
240 !d. at 452. 
2 41 !d. at 453-55. The Court also expressed serious doubts about the constitut iona lity o f the 
expression "known to be a member" on vagueness grounds. !d. at 458. Bw see Madse n v. Wo-
me n's Health Ct r. , Inc., 114 S. Ct. 251 6,2530 (1994) (holding e nj oining those acting " in conce rt" 
wi th named defend ants not vague). 
242 Lan zerta, 306 U.S. a t 453-58. 
2 43 See Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2524 (citing the specia l ri sk of di sc rimin atory applica tio n posed 
by injunctions); see also supra notes 134-52 and accompan ying tex t. 
244 See supra notes 1, 153 and accompanying text. 
2 45 TI1e risk of arbitrary enforceme nt increases in those cases where the gang was e njoined as 
a n unincorporated association rather than as individually named defendants. See supra notes 49, 
151 and accompanying text. Unlike in named-defendant cases, where a court reviews wheth er 
an injunction should be se rved upon a particular person, in unincorporated-associ ation cases, 
po lice gang experts decide upon whom to se rve inj unctions. See sup ra notes 49, 151 and accom-
panying text. Thus, in unincorporated-associatio n cases , the poss ibility of arbitrary enforce me nt 
appea rs in the decision to subject a person to the injunction as well as the dete rminati on of 
whether a person has violated the injunctio n. 
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pie, th e provision in the A cuna injunction prohibiting defe ndants from 
"s tanding, sitting, walking, driving, gath ering or appearing anywhere 
in public view with .. . any other known [gang] me mbe r"246 lacks a 
clear definition of gang membership and thus poses th e same notice 
problems as the sta tute in L anzetta. Like the statute in Lanzetta, 
th ese provisions leave the defendants guessing whether a person with 
whom th ey are standing or congregating is a gang member within the 
meaning of the injunction. 247 Moreover, the absence of a specific defi-
nition of gang membership makes the provision vulne rab le to arbi-
trary enforcemen t. Therefore, the provisions banning defendants 
from associating with o ther gang members probably a re unconstitu-
ti o nally vague . 
Two adjustments would mitiga te the vagueness proble ms posed 
by the Awna injunction.248 First, as in Acosta, the Acuna injunction 
should limit its prohibition of associational activity to other named 
de fendants.249 By limiting this prohibition to a discrete li st of names, 
th e provision more clearly notifies defendants with whom they are 
prohibited from appearing in public and is relatively unsusceptible to 
a rbitrary enforcement. 
Alternatively, the mJunction should incorporate a pre-existing 
statutory definition of gang membership e ither on the face of the in-
junction itself or by judicial construction.250 As noted earlie r, the Cal-
246 See People ex rei. City At to rney v. Acuna, No. 729322, slip op. at 2 (Ca l. Super. Ct. Santa 
Clara Count y June 28, 1993) (order granting preliminary injunction) . 
2 4 7 See Lanzeua, 306 U.S. at 455-57. Vagueness concerns in the Acuna injunction are par ticu-
larly acute because its use of the "known" gang member language that the Court found problem-
a tic in Lanzella . See supra note 241; see also Farber v. Rochford, 407 F. Su pp. 529, 531 -32 (N.D. 
Ill. 1975) (holding statute that prohibited "known" prostit utes from associa ting with other 
known prostitutes or fro m loi teri ng around bars to be unconstitutionally vague); City of D e troit 
v. Bowden, 149 N.W.2d 771 , 776 (Mich. Ct. App. 1967) (same). 
248 Municipalities have also employed a third approach to avoid vagueness cha llenges by in-
cluding a requirement that a defendant refuse a police order to disperse before a ga ng member 
can be liable for associational activity. See Lisa A. Kainec, Comment , Curbing Gang Relared 
Violence in America: Do Gang 1Hem bers Have a Conslirurional Righi ro Loirer on Our Srreers?, 
43 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 65 1, 664-66 (1993) (concluding that inclusion of dispersal req uirement 
in Chicago gang- loitering ordinance satisfies vagueness challenge). However, it is fa r fro m clear 
th at such a dispe rsal requireme nt is sufficient to protect such a regula tion from constitutional 
attack. Cf No rth ern Va . Chapter, ACLU v. City of Alexandria , 747 F. Supp. 324, 325, 328 (E.D. 
Va. 1990) (holding drug loite ring statute that included specific intent requirement to be unconsti-
tutiona lly overbroad) . 
2 4 9 E.g., People ex rei. Fletcher v. Acosta, No. EC 010205, slip op. at 4 (Cal. Supe r. Ct. Los 
Angeles Cou nty Nov. 2, 1992) (o rde r granting preliminary injunction) (prohibiting defendants 
from "standing, si lting, walking, driving, gathering or appearing anywhere in public view with 
any other defendanr BER member named herein" (e mphasis added)). This would necessarily 
enta il fo regoing enjoining gangs as unincorporated associations. See supra notes 49, 150-52, 158 
and accompanying tex t. 
250 Lanzeua, 306 U .S. at 456 (noting vague terms may be saved if a court places a limiting 
construction on them). To be effective, this lim iti ng construction shou ld be made before a give n 
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ifornia Street Terrori sm Enforcement and Prevention (STEP) Act 
includes a definition of gang membership25 1 that courts have held is 
not unconstitutionally vague.252 Thus, .the provisions limiting defend-
ants' ability to associate with other gang members can probably sur-
vive a vagueness challenge if their scope is limited to prohibiting 
association with other named defendants or if gang membership is de-
fined specifically enough to satisfy the Due Process Clause. 
With regard to overbreadth, a regulation is impermissibly over-
broad if it deters a substantial amount of constitutionally protected 
conduct while purporting to res trict or prohibit nonprotected activi-
ti es.253 If so, the Court must then evaluate whether the injunction is 
vulnerable to se lective en forcement.254 Given that association al activ-
ity among gang membe rs is ne ither sufficiently expressive nor intimate 
enough to receive constitutional protection,255 it is unlikely that an 
injunction te rm restricting gang m embers' ability to associate with one 
another will be found to de ter a substantial amount of constitutionally 
protected conduct, particul arly where alternate channels of communi-
cation are available .256 Moreover, as with void-for-vagueness, any 
concerns about possible selective enforcement can be dispelled by e n-
joining gang members by name and by incorporating a more speci f1c 
definition of gang membership.257 Thus, even if the terms restricting 
gang members ' associational activity do raise some overbreadth IS-
sues, as in void-for-vagueness, these issues can be easily settled. 
B. Prohibitions Against Annoying or Harassing Residents 
The provisions prohibiting defendants from annoying, harassing, 
intimidating, or threatening residents and citizens are also suspect on 
defendant 's case is conside red , as it is unfair to argue that a constructi on made subsequent to 
arrest gave a defendant notice of what conduct was prohibited. !d. 
251 CAL. PENAL CoDE§ 186.22(a) , (e). For the text of this definition, see supra note 155. For 
a list of similar definitions in o ther jurisdictions. see id. 
252 See In re Alberto R. (People v. Alberto R.) , 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 348 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); 
People v. Gamez, 286 Cal. Rptr. 894 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); People v. Green. 278 Ca l. Rptr. 140 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1991 ); accord State v. Walker, 506 N.W.2d 430, 432-33 (Iowa 1993) (upholding 
similar statute against vagueness challenge) . 
253 City of Houston v. Hill , 482 U.S. 451, 459 (1 987); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 
61 5 (1973). Injunctions can be overbroad in the same manner as sta tutes. Madsen v. Women's 
Health C tr. Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994); see also Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 
308. 321 n.1 (1980) (White , J .. dissenting) (noting that review did not repudiate lower court's 
ho lding that " [w]e re a Texas court to issue an overbroad injunction restricting nono bscene (and 
th erefore protected) matter. it would exceed both its co ns titutional and its statutory authority"); 
Ho uchins v. KQED , Inc .. 438 U.S. 1, IS (1978) (Stewart, J. , concurring) (noting injunctions must 
be framed to accommodate First A me ndment) . 
254 H ili, 482 U.S. at 465 -66; TI10rnhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95-98 (1940). 
255 See supra part III.A .J-2. 
256 See supra notes 94- 109 and accompanying tex t. 
257 See supra not es 2-\S-52 and accompanying tex t. 
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bo th vagueness and overbreadth grounds. 258 In Coates v. City of Cin -
cinnati ,259 the Court confronted a city o rdinance making it a criminal 
o ffense for " three or more pe rsons to assemble . . . on any of th e 
side walks .. . and there conduct themselves in a m anne r a nnoying to 
persons passing by. "260 The Court held that th e term " annoy" was 
neither suffi ci ently definite th at persons of common intellige nce could 
unde rsta nd what conduct was being prohibited, nor specific enough to 
o ffe r standards th at d iscourage arbitra ry enforceme nt.261 Therefore , it 
held th at the o rdinance was void for vagueness .262 Injunctio ns that 
have used term s such as "annoy" without any furth er explanation 
raise vagueness problems similar to those raised in Coates .26 3 There-
fo re, antigang injuncti ons that e mpl oy such terms without further defi-
nitio n264 run th e ri sk of be ing found void for vagueness. 
H owever, ci ties can take steps to avoid vague ness proble ms. For 
example, injunctions using terms such as "harass" and "annoy" have 
survived vagueness chall enges when th e injunction included a specific 
intent requirement265 or more specific definiti ons o f " harass" and " an-
noy."266 If draft ers o f anti gang injunctions include similar language , 
such injunction provisions will more likely survive vague ness 
challenge. 
Coates also held th at terms such as "harass" and "annoy," when 
used without further definiti on, ra ise significant overbreadth con-
258 See M. Katherine Boychuk . Comment , A re Stalking Laws Unconstitwionally Vague or 
Overbroad? , 88 Nw. U. L. R Ev. 769, 784 (1 994) (noting that the terms "ha rass" and "a nnoy" 
pose vague ness problems) . 
259 402 U.S. 611 (1971). 
260 !d. at 611. 
261 !d. at 61 4 & n.4. 
262 !d. at 614. 
2 63 E. g., Foods Inc. v. Leffle r, 240 N.W.2d 91 4, 923 (Iowa 1976) (d issolving injunction tha t 
prohibited " annoying persons attempting to e nter [a su permarket] " whe re what constituted an-
noying acti vity was not specified). Comme nta to rs have noted, however, that courts have appli ed 
Coates inconsistently, making any predictions based on CMtes somewhat unce rtain . See, e.g., 
Boychuk, supra note 258, at 785, 788. 
264 See supra part IT . B.S. 
265 E. g., Superior Sav. Ass 'n v. Cleve land Council of U nemployed Wo rke rs, 501 N.E.2d 91, 
95 -96 (O hio Ct. App. 1986). 
266 E. g .. State v. Zoellick. 466 N.W.2d 911 (Wis. Ct. A pp.) (unpu blished disposi tion ava ilab le 
at 1991 WL 19070) (ho lding injunc tion contai ni ng explicit de fini tion of " harassment" no t uncon-
stitutionally vague), review denied, 471 N.W.2d 510 (Wis. 1991) ; cf Peopl e v. Whitfield , 498 
N.E.2d 262 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (holding that " harass" used in statute not vague whe n viewed in 
light of contex t and purpose of sta tute) : Sta te v. Smith , 737 P.2d 723, 725 (Wash. Ct. App.) 
(ho lding sta tute contain ing explicit de fi ni tion of " harassment" not unconstitutionally vague) 
aff'd , 759 P.2d 372 (Wash. 1988). But see City o f Seattle v. Huff, 75 1 P.2d 879, 881-82 (Wash Ct. 
App. 1988) (holding ordinance that d id not contain explicit definition of " harass" or "intimi-
da te" not vague), aff'd, 767 P.2d 572 (Wash. 1989). In the absence of such definiti ons o n the face 
of the injunction, courts may wish to look to othe r stat uto ry definiti o ns of harassment to so lve 
vagueness prob lems. 
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ce rns. 267 The lack of clarifying s tand ards rend ers these prohibitions 
quite susceptible to selective e nforcement. 268 However, the over-
breadth concerns can be addressed in much the same way as the 
vague ness concerns were addressed26'-J since courts have tended to up-
hold regulations using such te rms when they included more specific 
definitions of what constituted ha rass ing or annoying behavior e ither 
directly or by reference to other sta tutory provisions.27° 
Y. PROCED U RAL D uE PRoc Ess 
In addition to potentially violating a ll eged gang members' sub-
sta nti ve co nstitution al righ ts, the use of antigang injunctions and othe r 
civil remedies to control antisocia l behavio r raises e quall y serious 
quest ions about alleged gang members' procedural constituti onal 
r ights.:m Commentators have exp ressed concern that increased use of 
civil rem edies to control be havio r trad itio nally addressed by the crimi-
na l law will effectively circumvent the procedural protections nor-
mally accorded criminal defendants by th e Co nstitution. 272 
A mong civil remedies, injunctions place particularly severe pres-
sure o n defendants' procedural rights.273 As the Court noted in iHad-
sen v. Women's H ealth Center, Inc. : 
There are obvious differences ... between an injunction and a generally 
ap plicable ordinance. Ordinances represent a legislative choice regard-
ing promotion of particular societal inte rests. Injunctions, by contrast, 
267 See Coates, 402 U .S a t 614-15; Boychuk , supra note 258, at 785-87. 
268 See supra no te 254 and accompanyi ng text. As with vo id-fo r-vagueness challenges to in-
junctions using the te rms '·a nnoy" and " harass '" without any further explanat ion, courts have 
bee n inconsistent with their views of such res trictions. Compare Donley v. City o f Mountain 
Brook, 429 So. 2d 603, 611-13 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982) (upholding te lephone harassmen t sta tute 
using te rms without explanation as no t overbroad), rev 'd on other grounds sub nom. Ex parte 
Donley, 429 So. 2d 618 (Ala. 1983) with City of Everett v. Moo re, 683 P.2d 617, 618-19 (Wash. 
Ct . App. 1984) (invalidating general harassment statute using simil ar language as ove rbroad) . 
See generally Boychuk, supra note 258 a t 786-87 & n.l01 (detai ling cases dealing with over-
breadt h challenges to ge neral harassment, telephone harassmen t, and d isorderl y conduct sta t-
utes using the te rms "harass" and " annoy"). 
269 See supra notes 265 -66 and accompanyin g text. 
270 See supra notes 250-52, 257. 266 and accompan yi ng text. 
271 See Cheh, supra note 20, a t 1371-89; Jonathan I. Charney. The Need fo r Consiitutional 
Pr01ections for Defendams in Civil Penalty Cases. 59 CoR C' ELL L. R Ev . 478, 482 (1974); Kennet h 
Mann, Pwzirive Civil Sanctions: Th e Middleground Bei\Veen Crimina l and Civil L aw , 101 YALE 
L.J. 1795, 1798, 1843 (1992). 
272 Charney, supra note 271, at 482, 516-1 7; Cheh, supra note 20, a t 1394-1404; Mann. supra 
note 271 , at 1871; see a/so F ELI X FRA N KFURT E R & NATHAN GREEN E, THE L ABOR I NJUNCTION 
107 & n.l 05 (1963) (stating that "( t]o make the infraction of a criminal statue also a conte mpt of 
court is esse ntially an inve ntion to evade the sa feguards of criminal proced ure and to cha nge the 
tribunal for determining guilt" ). 
273 See Cheh, supra note 20, at 1364-69: Earl C. Dud ley, Geuing Beyond the Civil/Criminal 
D isrin crion: A New Approach to lhe Regulation of Indirect Contemp1s. 79 V A. L. REv. 1025, 
103-+- 47 (1993) . 
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are remedies imposed fo r vi o lations (or threa tened violations) o f a legis-
la ti ve o r judicial decree. Injunctions also carry grea ter ri sks of ce nsor-
ship and di scriminatory application than do general ordinances .274 
In particular, th e wide discretion given judges in fashioning public 
nuisance remedies suggests that greate r procedural pro tection is ap-
propriate . Public nuisance sta tutes a re stated in extremely broad 
t erms,27~ giving judges the freedom to proscribe otherwise legal acts 
and create pe rsonal criminal codes.276 When the breadth of these stat-
utes is combined with the extreme deference accorded by reviewing 
courts to th e issuance of public nuisance injunctions, 2 77 a judge 's 
power to fashion such rem edies is immen se.27~:> 
A t first blush, procedural concerns rai sed by antigang injuncti o ns 
appear to be mitigated by the fact that injunctions are enforced by 
criminal contempt proceedings during which the defendant is entitled 
to the full range of procedura l protections normally associa ted with 
criminal law. 279 H owever, on closer inspection, it becomes apparent 
th at these protections are provided only when it is too late to affect 
the merits of the case . This is because injunctions are subj ect to the 
"colla teral bar rule ," which prevents defendants from challe nging the 
constitutionality of an injunction at a contempt of court hearing, re-
quiring that defendants instead raise these issues in a motion to dis-
solve the injunction. This rule therefore limits the issues in a 
contempt of court hearing to whether the court had jurisdiction to 
issue the injunction and whether the defendant knowingly violated 
it. 280 Given this bar to constitutional challenges at the contempt stage , 
it is particularly important that those defendants be provided with 
both the opportunity and the resources to contest the injunction 's con-
stitutionality before the action reaches that stage . 
The provision of two procedural protections would greatly lower 
the risk that a person will be subjected to an erroneous or unconstitu-
2 74 Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr. , Inc. , 114 S. Ct. 25 16,2524 (1994) (cita tions omitted ). 
275 See, e.g. , CAL Ctv. CoDE §§ 3479, 3480. For full tex t of these statutes, see supra note 24. 
276 Cheh, supra no te 20, at 1406, 1407. 
277 Whethe r an injunction sh all be granted is a ma tter resting in the sound discretion o f the 
tria l court. Cate rpillar Tractor Co. v. Internati onal Harvester Co., 106 F.2d 769 (9th Ci r. 1939); 
Wholesale Tobacco D ea lers Bureau v. National Candy & Tobacco Co. , 82 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1938). 
278 Cf Cheh, supra note 20, at 1407-08 (discussing the potenti al fo r judicial abuse in civil 
protection o rders for domestic violence). The sa me potential fo r abuse Professor Cheh sees in 
ci vil protection orders exists with regard to antigang nuisance abatement orders. 
2 79 Cheh, supra note 20, at 1368; Dudley, supra note 273 , a t 1032 & n.22. Note tha t increasing 
th e procedural protections afforded enjoined gang membe rs will like ly reduce the a ttractive ness 
of antigang injunctions as an law enfo rcement tool. See supra note 157. 
2RO See Walker v. City o f Birmingham , 388 U.S. 307 (1967); U nited States v. United Mine 
Workers, No. 759, 330 U.S. 258 (1947); Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181 (1922). This rule is not 
universa l. Fo r example, the Cal ifornia Supreme Court in the past has allowed de fendants to 
ch allenge the constitutionality of injuncti ons without moving to di ssolve them notwithstanding 
the colla tera l bar rule. In re Barry, 436 P.2d 273, 280-82 (Cal. l96R). 
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tiona! ant iga ng injunction. First, judges should not issue court orders 
ex parte, depriving the subj ect of the injunction of the chance to be 
heard on the matter and shifting the burden of proof to the a lleged 
gang member to show that th e court order was improperly applied.281 
Second, indige nt defendants should be provided with appointed coun-
sel so that they can chall enge both the scope of the injunction and the 
factua l basis for subject ing them to the injunction.2 82 
1l1e Supreme Court has developed two separate approaches to 
determine which procedural protections should apply in specific cases , 
and this Part will analyze the applicability of each approach to anti -
gang inj unctions. First, the Court has developed an expansive, if 
somew hat incoherent, jurisprudence to determine whether the proce-
dural protections normally associated with the criminal law should ap-
ply to civil remedies closely aligned with the criminal law. 283 Second, 
starting wi th the landmark case of Mathews v. Eldridge,284 the Court 
has held that the Due Process Clauses mandate certain procedures 
eve n in civil cases. 2s5 Secti on A concludes that antigang injunctions 
probably do not meet the criteria for invoking criminal-type proce-
dural protecti ons. Section B argues that under two post-Mathews 
cases, United States v. Jam es Daniel Good R eal Property2 i>6 and 
Lassiter v. Department of Social Services ,287 alleged gang me mbers 
sho uld be provided with a contested hearing and appointed counsel 
before injunctions are imposed. 
A. The Civil/Criminal Distinction and Criminal 
Procedural Protections 
The distinction between the civil and criminal law, while paradig-
matic in A nglo-American law, has proven quite elusive.288 The funda-
mental question becomes what is the proper means for drawing this 
distinction,289 and the Court has used both formal and function al tests 
281 Cf Cheh, supra note 20, at 1399-1400, 1407 (questioning the sufficie ncy of ex par1e proce-
dures in civi l forfeiture and recogn izing that civil protection o rde rs may be issued ex parte ). The 
use of ex parte procedures may also put pressure aga inst the Fifth Amendment privilege against 
se lf-incrimination in cases where the basis for the civil remedy may form the basis for a criminal 
prosecution as we ll. !d. at 1384-89. 
282 See id. a t 1394-95 . 
283 See Mann. supra note 271, at 1816-43. 
284 424 U.S. 319 (1976) . 
2 85 !d. at 333-34. 
286 114 S. Ct. 492 (1993) (5-4 decision) . 
287 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (5-4 decision). 
288 Professo r Mann has identifi ed severa l paradigmatic distinctions between the civi l and 
crim ina l law, including the presence of co mpensa tory versus punitive purposes behind the regu-
lat ion , th e use of subject ive ve rsus objective liability, the types of re medies available. and the 
types of procedures used. Mann, supra not e 271, at 1805-13 . 
289 Cheh, supra note 20, at 1325 , 1348-49; J. Morris Clark, Civil and Criminal Penalties and 
Forfeirures: A Framework for Constitutional Analysis, 60 MINN. L. R Ev. 379, 397 (1976); Ta mara 
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to determine whether a sanction is criminal or civi!290 and thus 
whe ther a defendant should or should not receive the full range of 
constitutional criminal procedural protections.291 
At times , the Court has adopted a formal test , deferring to Con-
gress's designation of a remedy as ci vil and treating the civil/criminal 
question as one of statutory construction.292 Under one version of this 
test, the legislature's designation of a sanction as civil or criminal be-
came the key factor in de termining whether criminal procedural pro-
tections should apply. 293 In another version , the Court focused on the 
presence or absence of certain procedures and remedies to determine 
whe ther a sanction was civil or crimina\.294 Given nuisance doctrine's 
historical and statutory basis in civil law295 and the fact that nuisance 
actions do no t invo lve the procedures or the remedies traditionally 
associated with the criminal law,296 it is unlikely that a formal test 
would indicate that defendants of antigang injunctions should be af-
forded the procedural protections granted criminal defendants. 
Commentators have criticized formal tests on a number of 
grounds.297 The principal criticism was that in focusing on instrumen-
tal indicia and ignoring the consequences of the sanction, the formal 
test often found sanctions to be civil even though they lacked the kind 
R. Pi e ty, Comment, Scorched Earth: How the Expansion of Civil Forfeiture Doctrin e H as Laid 
Wasre to Due Process, 45 U. MIAMI L. R Ev. 911, 943 (1991). 
290 Note that these approaches should not be considered mutually exclusive . Supreme Court 
decisions have often combined form al a nd functional approaches. E.g., United States v. Ward, 
448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1 980) ; Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963) ; 
He lvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 , 395, 398-405 (1938). 
291 These rights include the right to a public trial , the right to confront one 's accusers, the 
right of compulsory process, the right to a speedy trial, th e right to be informed of the nature of 
the accusation , the right to a jury trial (when the possibl e incarceration exceeds six months) , and 
the r ight to counse l. See Charney, supra note 271, at 478-89. 
292 E.g. , lvlitchell, 303 U .S. at 399. 
293 See Stockwell v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 531 (1871). See generally Mann , supra 
no te 271, at 1820-23 (tracing the development of the formal approach); Lawrence A . Kaste n , 
Note, Extending Constiwrional Prorection to Civil Forfeiwres that Exceed Rough Rem edial Com -
pensalion, 60 G EO. WASH. L. REv. 194, 205-06, 210 (1991) (same). 
294 E.g. , !'>'lendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69; H elwig v. United States, 188 U.S. 605 , 610-12 
(1903). See generally Charney, supra note 271 , at 491-505 (providing a complete catalog of in-
strumental crite ria used by the Court). 
295 See, e. g., supra note 24. 
296 For exa mple, although nuisance actions bear some o f the indicia of a criminal action, see 
Charney, supra note 27.1. , at 505 (state as the plaintiff) , the vast majority of instrumental indicia 
indicate that nuisance actions are not criminal , because they a re not initiated by indictment, do 
not require scie nter, lack a sense of mo ral conde mnation, and do not involve incarceration, see 
id. at 491-505. 
297 Commentato rs have , imer alia , criticized the form al approach because it is circula r- a 
sanction is civil because it is civil , Mann, supra note 271, at 1823; Piety, supra note 289, at 920, 
and because defe rence to fo rm al designations would obviate the Court 's historical role in re-
viewing legislation to dete rmine whether Congress has exceeded its constitutional auth orit y, 
Charney, sup ra note 271, at 494. 
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of proportionality to be expected under the compensation-oriented 
civil paradigm.298 Consequently, the Court has been forced to charac-
terize particularly harsh sanctions as government reimbursements 299 
or liquidated damages300 to explain the apparent disproportionality 
and to justify calling them civiJ.301 
This has led many commentators to prefer a functional test simi-
lar to the one advanced in Boyd v. United Srates,302 in which the Court 
used a functional test to compare the purpose of a civil forfeiture sta t-
ute and the nature of its remedy, determined the sanction to be 
"quasi-criminal," and extended to civil defendants of such actions 
some of the protections normally afforded only to criminal defend-
ants.303 In making such a comparison, a functional test can represe nt 
the proportionality demanded by the compensation-oriented civil law 
paradigm. Therefore, under the functional test, particularly egregious 
terms in an antigang injunction might be sufficiently disproportionate 
to render an antigang injunction "quasi-criminal" and allow injunction 
defendants to receive some of the benefits of criminal procedural pro-
tections.304 However, subsequent decisions of the Court have severely 
298 See C lark, supra note 289, at 469-75; Mann, supra note 271, at 1823-30; Piety , supra note 
289, at 958. 
299 E.g., Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 401-02 (1938) (characterizing in part 50% addi-
tion to tax deficiency as a rei mbursement for investigation cost). 
300 E.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leas ing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 687 n.26 (1974) (calling 
forfeiture in part security for violations of the law); cf United States ex rei. Marcus v. Hess, 317 
U.S. 537, 549-50 (1943) (analogizing double damages to liquidated damages) (superseded by 
statute). 
301 Professor Mann termed the Cou rt 's characterization of certain sanctions as remedial to fit 
them into the paradigm a " lega l fiction." Mann , supra no te 271, a t 1830; see also Clark. supra 
note 289, at 391-92 & nn.38-40. 
302 116 U.S. 616 (1886). See generally Mann. supra note 271. at 1818-19 (describing the func-
tional approach). 
303 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 634; see also Charney, supra note 271 , at 516 (advocating the functional 
approach); Mann, supra note 271, a t 1818-19 (advocating the functional approach). But see 
Cheh, supra note 20, a t 1360 (advocating a formal approach but arguing for expanded proce -
dural pro tections in civil actions ge nerally). 
304 Injunctions are arguably poorly suited to functional analysis. Such an alysis necessarily 
requires a comparison of the value of the sancti on assessed aga inst the defendant with the ap-
proximate costs to the government. See Halper v. United States, 490 U.S. 435, 446-48 ( 1989); 
Mann, supra note 271, at 1840. However, it is particularly difficult to determine the value reme-
dies such as injunctions present to defendants , making it difficult for an e nj oined party to 
demonstrate the kind of imbalance necessa ry to trigger th e extension of procedural protections 
under functional analysis. 
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limited Boyd305 and have used the functional approach very 
infrequently. 30 6 
Both the critics and the supporters of the Court's tendency to-
ward form alism saw the Court's 1989 decision of United States v. 
Halper307 as a possible return to functional tests. 308 In Halper, the 
respondent was convicted of making $585 in false claims to the federal 
government and sentenced to two years in prison and a $5,000 fine. 309 
The government subsequently instituted a civil action against him in 
which he was fined more than $130,000.310 Respondent moved to dis-
miss on the basis of double jeopardy.3 11 Focusing on the strand of 
double jeopardy that prohibits multiple punishments for the same of-
fe nse, the Court held that the governmen t was entitled to rough reme-
dia l justice in a civil action. 31 2 However, the Court held that when the 
supposedly remedial sanction does not approximate the government's 
actual damages and costs, rough justice becomes injustice, and the 
purportedly remedial sanction becomes punishment and is barred by 
double jeopardy.3 13 The Court distinguished Ward by reasoning that 
while the civil/criminal distinction may be important for double jeop-
ardy's other aspects, the civil/criminal distinction was unimportant 
with regard to the multiple punishments aspect.3 14 
Given the Court's previous deference to Congress's designation 
of a sanction as civil and its tendency toward formalism and toward 
finding remedial purposes in similar cases,31 5 commentators viewed 
the Court's return to a functional analysis in determining whether a 
305 See, e.g., United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980) (declining to extend Boyd's Fifth 
Amendment protections in civil forfeiture cases to civil fines cases); see also Kas ten , supra note 
293, at 203-05 (noting that the Court has declined to apply other criminal procedural protections, 
such as the reasonable-doubt burden of proof, Fifth and Sixth Amendment procedural protec-
tions, the prohibitions of the Ex Post Facto Clause, and the Double Jeopardy Cl ause , to civil 
forfeiture cases). 
306 E ven when the Court used a functional test, it did so in an extremely limited way. For 
example, in Ward , although the Court combined functional and formal tests in determining 
whether civil fines should be protected by the Fifth Amendment , it imposed a pres umption in 
favor of Congress's designation of a statute as civil o r criminal, requiring " the clearest proof" 
before the presumption would be displaced. Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-49. Thus, eve n though the 
Court nominally applied a functional test, in imposing a presumption in favor of the formal test, 
the Court effectively eviscerated the test. See Kasten, supra note 293, at 210-11. 
307 490 U .S. 435 (1989). 
308 See Cheh, supra note 20, at 1375-76; Mann, supra note 271, at 1842-43. 
309 Halper, 490 U.S. at 437. 
310 !d. at 438. 
311 !d. 
312 !d. at 446. 
313 !d. 
314 !d. at 448. 
315 See, e.g., Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391,402 (1938) (applying formal approach implic-
itly); Stockwell v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 531, 552 (1871) (applying formal approach 
explicitly); see also supra notes 292-96 and accompanying text. 
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cons ti tut ional procedural protection applied in a civil case as a poten-
ti al jurisp ruden tia l breakthrough.316 Although the Court had neve r 
formally repudiated the functional approach it followed in Boyd, its 
disuse raised serious questions as to its vitality.317 In Halper , com-
mentators saw ren ewed potential for functional ana lys is to justify a 
much broader extension of criminal procedural protections to ci vi l 
cases,31R a lthough such a consequence was far from mandated.J19 
The extent to which Halp er marked a change in the Court's ap-
proach to punitive civil sanctions was partially answered in Austin v. 
Un ited Stares.320 In A ustin , the Court addressed whether the E ighth 
Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause applied to civil forfeiture where 
the government was the moving party.321 Following Halper' s focus on 
the punit ive/nonp unitive distinction rather than the civil/crimi na l dis-
tinction , the Court began by observing th at the E ighth Ame ndment 
was intended to preven t the government from abusing its power to 
punish an d that unlike the Sixth Amendment and the se lf-incrimina-
tion clause of the Fifth Amendment, nothing in the text or the history 
of the E ighth A mendment limited it to criminal cases_:m The Court 
co ncluded that since forfeitures have historically been viewed as pun-
ish ment and the re was nothing in the text or the legislative history of 
t he forfei ture sta tute in question to indicate that anything bu t punish-
ment was intended , the forfeiture in question was properly conside red 
punishment and was subject to the Excessive Fines Clause of the 
E ighth A mendment.J23 
A ny inference that Halp er marked a return to the functional ap-
proach to the civil/criminal distinction is undercut by Austin. A ustin 
re lied exclusively on formal statutory analysis,324 in stark contrast to 
the functional reasoning of Halper. 325 When read together, it be-
comes rather unlikely that Halper represents a widespread re turn to 
functional tests. Instead, the common thread in Austin and Halp er is 
the Court 's focus on the punitive/nonpunitive distinction in determin-
ing whether grea ter proced ural protection should be extended, not the 
type of analysis used . 
316 Cheh, supra note 20. at 1375 -76; Mann, supra note 271 , at 1842-43: Kasten, supra note 293 , 
at 226-43. 
317 See Mann. sup ra note 271 , at 1842. 
31 :> Che h, supra note 20, at 1375-76; Mann, supra note 271 , at 1842-43; Kasten, supra note 293, 
at 226 -43. 
319 Cheh, supra note 20, at 1377-79. 
:no 1135.0.2801 (1993). 
321 !d. at 2803. 
322 !d. at 2805. 
3 23 Note thai !lusrin in no way repudiated the funct ional analysis of Haiper a nd sho uld not be 
inte rpreted as preciuding a subsequem court from adopti ng a functi onal pe rspective. 
324 A1win, 113 S. Ct. at 2805. 
325 Halper. 490 U.S. at 448. 
259 
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 
In sum, although Halper and Austin mark a breakthrough in ex-
tending certain procedural protections to civil cases, they probably do 
not indicate a widespread return to functional analysis. Accordingly, 
the Court will likely continue to rely on formal analysis in drawing the 
civil /criminal distinction and will likely not extend the right to a con-
tested hearing and the right to appointed counsel to all antigang in-
junction cases because they are quasi-criminal. 
B. The ]\!Iathews Balancing Test and Civil Procedu ral Due 
Process Protecrions 
The D ue Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees that 
" [n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process o f law."326 Under the requirements of due process , the 
Supreme Court has established that civil defendants are generally en-
titled to notice, an opportunity to be heard, and such other procedures 
as will ensure an accurate and rational resolution.327 The three-part 
balancing test laid out in Mathews v. Eldridge328 determines what pro-
cedures due process requires in civil actions. Mathews requires courts 
to conside r: (1) the private interest affected by the official action, (2) 
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that interest through the pro-
cedures used, and (3) the government's interests, including the admin-
istrative burden that the additional procedural requirements would 
pose.329 
This section argues that the Court's decisions applying the M a-
thews test in other civil proceedings indicates that these same protec-
tions should be extended to defendants of antigang injunctions. 
Subsection 1 argues that courts should not impose antigang injunc-
tions ex parte, and subsection 2 argues that enjoined gang members 
should be given the right to appointed counsel to enable indigents to 
defend themselves. 
1. Ex parte Proceedings as D etermined in James Daniel Good 
Real Property v. United States.-The right to prior notice and a 
predeprivation hearing is central to the Constitution's commands of 
due process.3 30 Such a hearing helps ensure fairness for the individual 
32fi U .S. CoNsT. amend. V. 'n1e Court has interpre ted libe rty and prope rty broadly, subjec t-
mg actions to termina te we lfare be nefits, garnish wages, revoke a driver 's license. a nd d ismiss a 
fe deral e mployee to due process sc rutiny. Mathews v. E ldridge. 424 U.S. 319, 333-34 (1976). 
327 Mathews , 424 U.S. at 333 -34. 
328 424 U. S. 319 (!976). 
329 !d. at 335. 
330 U nit ed States v. James Danie l Good R eal Property, 114 S. Ct. 492, 498 (1993) (5 -4 deci-
sion); U nited States v. $8 ,850,461 U.S. 555,562 n.12 (1983); Fuentes v. Shevin , 407 U .S. 67,80-
82 (1 972); Mullane v. Cent rai Hanove r Bank & Trust Co .. 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). 
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and serves to protect citizens from arbitrary government 
encroachment.331 
The Court has allowed exceptions to the general rule requirin g 
predeprivation notice and hearing only in "extraordinary situations 
where some valid governm ental interest is a t stake that justifies post-
poning the hearing until after the eve nt. "332 In United States v. Jam es 
Daniel Good Real Property, 33-' the federal gove rnment seized the re-
spondent's home and the land on which it stood in an ex parte pro-
ceeding.334 The Court considered whether due process prohibited the 
govern ment in a civil forfe iture case from se izing real property with-
out first affording the owner no tice and an opportunity to be heard.335 
The Court appli ed the Mmhews tes t in evaluating the sufficiency 
of the ex parte proceeding.336 It concluded that the first Mathews fac-
tor-the priva te interest affected by the offi cial ac tion - favored the 
respondent.337 In so holding, the Court ana logized Good to its deci-
sion in Fuentes v. Shevin3 38 where it held that the loss of kitchen appli-
ances and household furniture was signi fican t eno ugh to warrant a 
deprivation hearing.339 The Good Court concluded th at the respon-
dent 's interests in his home far exceeded those in Fuen tes in mere 
chattels and that his interes ts in maintaining control of his home and 
being free from governmental interference "weigh[ ed) heavily in the 
Mathews balance."34o 
The Good Court also concluded that the second Mathews factor 
favored the respondent because the ex parte seizure created an unac-
ceptable risk of error.341 The Court reasoned that " [t)he purpose of 
an adversary hearing is to ensure the requisite neutrality that must 
inform all governmental decisionmaking."342 A postse izure hearing, 
the Court noted, may be no recompense for losses caused by an erro-
neous determination given the backlog of civil cases and the fact that 
the subsequent hearing, even if decided in favor of the respondent , 
331 Good. 114 S. Ct. at 500-01. 
332 !d. at 501 (quotati ons omitted); see also Fuemes, 407 U.S. at 82; Boddi e v. Connecticut , 
401 U .S. 371, 379 (1971). 
333 114 S. Ct. 492 (1993) (5-4 decisio n). 
334 !d. at 497. 
335 !d. 
336 !d. at 501. 
337 !d. 
338 407 U.S. 67 ( 1972). 
339 !d. at 70-71 (ci ted in Good , 114 S. Ct. at 501) . 
340 Good, 114 S. C t. at 501. 
341 /d . 
342 !d. at 502. The Court also noted that "' fairne ss can rarely be obtai ned by secret, one-
sided determination o f facts decisive o f rights . . . No be tter in strument has been devised for 
a rri ving at t ruth th an to give a pe rso n in jeopardy of se rious loss notice o f the case agai nst him 
and o pportun ity to meet it.'" /d. at 504 (quoting Joi nt Anti -Fascist R efugee Comm. v. McGrath . 
341 U.S . 123, 170-72 (1951) (Frankfurte r, J. co ncurring)). 
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" 'would not cure the temporary deprivation th at an earlier hearing 
might have prevented.' "343 
Furthermore, the Court found that the third Mathews factor fa -
vored the respondent. The Court framed the governmenta l inte res t as 
the pressing need for prompt action in the particular case. 344 The 
Court concluded th at in this case , unlike in forfeiture cases in volving 
chattels, there was no pressing need to justify ex p arte seizure because 
the property seized was real property that could not abscond and the 
government's interests could be adequately protected by filing a lis 
pendens against it.345 In so holding, th e Court distinguished Calera -
Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co . ,w; in which it upheld the ex parte 
seizure of a yacht.347 Unlike Calero-Toledo , in which the m ovable na-
ture of the property required tha t the court se ize the property to es-
tablish jurisdiction over it and prevent it from disappearing, Good 
involved real property, the immobility of which guaranteed jurisdic-
tion and prevented disappearance .348 
The Court's decision in Good supports the conclusio n that the ex 
parte issuance of antigang injunctio ns violates the requirem ents o f due 
process under Mathews. First, the gang members' private interes ts in 
personal liberty should be significant enough to tip the first fac tor in 
the ir favor. Although in weighing the first Mathews factor courts have 
been disinclined to give significant weight to nonproperty interests,34 9 
courts could just as well follow the Supreme Court's reasoning in 
Good and conclude that gang members ' liberty interests in associating 
with others, moving freely about their neighborhoods, and controlling 
their own appearance are more constitutionally significant than, for 
instance, a party's interest in kitchen appliances and household furni-
ture.350 Moreover, the recognition in Good that all individuals have a 
strong interest in remaining free from governmental inte rests also 
" weighs heavily in the Mathews balance" against ex parte issuance of 
antigang injunctions.3s1 
Second, the risk of error in issuing an injunction against gang 
members is quite significant. As noted earlier, governmental bodies 
depend on adversarial hearings to ensure fairness and prevent arbi-
trary decision making.352 Moreover, as noted earlier, law enforce-
ment's frequent use of legally insufficient evidence m gang cases 
343 l d. at 502 (quo ti ng Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 15 (1 99 1)). 
34 -1 Jd. . 
345 Jd. at 502-04. 
346 416 U.S. 663 (1974). 
347 Id. at 679. 
348 Good, 114 S. Ct. at 502-03 . 
349 See Cheh , sup ra note 20, at 1395. 
350 See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 70-7 1 (1972). 
351 See supra note 340 an d accompanying text. 
352 See supra notes 330-31, 342 and accompanying text. 
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indicates that InJUnctions against alleged gang members run particu-
larly high risks of error.353 The ability of court orders to act as " pri-
va te penal codes" makes the consequences of erroneous 
determination particularly onerous.354 And lastl y, as in Good, the op-
portunity for a subsequent contested hearing may not be timely and in 
any even t would likely be insufficient to cure the deprivation of liberty 
suffered by the gang members.355 
Most importantly, the third Mathews factor clearly favors the al-
leged gang members. As noted in Good, the hallmark of an important 
governmental interest is a pressing need for ex parre proceed ings ,35 6 
such as the possibility of property disappearing357 or imminen t clan-
ger.358 No such pressing need is present in the ant igang injunctio n 
cases. In fact, allowing governments to enjoin gangs ex parte might 
destroy an opportunity to deter gang activity, since one function of 
court orders is to give suspected gang members notice th at the ir con-
duct is in question and that serious consequences will ensue if they 
pe rsist in the ir present behavior.359 Were governments required to 
give defendants notice and a hearing before injunctions were issued, 
they might find tha t the notice of hearing alone is enough to induce 
them to leave, solving the area's gang problem.360 Thus, applying the 
logic of Good, it is unlikely that courts will be able to justify using ex 
parte proceedings to enjoin criminal street ga ngs. 
353 See supra part III.A.3. 
354 See supra notes 20, 273-78 and accompanying text. As noted earlier , the colla te ra l bar rule 
makes the consequences of the erroneo us imposition of an injunction part icula rly ha rsh. See 
supra notes 279-80 and accompanying text. 
355 Good, 114 S. Ct. at 502. 
356 !d. 
357 See Calera-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 679 (1974). 
358 Cf Cheh, supra note 20, at 1405 & n.427 (noting use of ex parte re lief in awa rding court 
o rders in e mergency cases of domestic violence). 
359 !d. at 1405. 
360 See Nick Anderson, S.J. Vows to Rid Area of Gangs: Injuncrion Targers One Neighb or-
hood, S AN Jo sE MERCURY NEws, Mar. 10, 1993, at 1A (reporting tha t gang membe rs subject to 
injunct io n a re likely to leave area before enforcement is necessa ry). This di s ting uishes a ntiga ng 
injunctio ns from the special circumstances found in Calero-Toledo that justified proceedi ng ex 
parte. In Calero- Toledo, the government's interest in ex parte proceedings was st rength ened 
because the chattels in ques tion might disa ppear, which would have eliminated the basis for 
federa l jurisd iction a nd would have a llowed the defendants to hide th em. Calero -Toledo , 416 
U.S. a t 679. In antigang injunctions, there is no quest ion of jurisdiction , see Good, 114 S. Ct. at 
502-04, and the possibility that the gang me mbers might disa ppear we ighs in the o ther d irect ion 
beca use the ir disappea rance would fa cilitate rather than complica te the governmen t 's act ions. 
Any argument tha t the government interest remains strong because the disappeara nce of the 
gang membe rs merely transfers the problem to another ne ighborhood, while having some per-
suas iveness with regard to criminal sanctions, would be inappropriate in a civil nuisance act ion, 
which is aimed at protecting cit izens' enjoyme nt of their prope rt y. 
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2. The Right to Appointed Counsel in Civil Actions as D eter-
mined in Lassi ter v. Department of Social Services.-The alleged gang 
members ' right to co unse l prior to the contempt of court stage is criti-
cal. 'Without it , they cannot realistically contes t the propriety of the 
injunct ions before facing contempt of court charges, and the co llatera l 
bar rule reduces any hearing they receive after being cha rged with 
contempt to a mere formality instead of the constitutional protection 
it is intended to be.361 
The key case in determining whe ther gang members should have 
a right to counsel in a civil ac tion is Lassiter v. Department of Social 
Services. 362 In Lassiter, the Court evaluated the petitione r 's r ight to 
appoint ed co unsel in a hearing to terminate her parenta l rights.36 3 
The Court began by abstracting from its precedents the presumptio n 
agai nst the appointment of counsel in cases where the liti ga nt is not 
faced with the deprivation of physical liberty.364 The Court acknowl-
edged th at o ther courts had traditionally dealt with the right to ap-
poi nted counsel on a class-by-class basis, generally requmng 
appointed counsel in all hearings for termination of parenta l rights.365 
The Court then rej ected the class-by-class approach for de termining 
whether counsel should be appointed in a given proceeding in favor of 
a case-by-case determination by the trial judge.366 
The Court then applied the Mathews factors to determine 
whether counsel should be appointed in the petitioner's case.367 The 
Court fo und the petitione r's interest in her parental relationship with 
361 Cf Jay A. Rosenbe rg, Note, Constitutional Rights and Civil Forfeiture Actions, 88 CoLUM . 
L. R Ev. 390, 403-06 (1988) (arguing for appointed counsel in civil forfeiture actions). In fact, the 
ACLU reques ted the appointment of counsel in at least two antigang injunctio n cases. People v. 
" B" St. Boys, No. 735405-4, slip op. at 2 (Cal. Super. Ct. Alameda County June 17, 1994) (order 
denying prelimina ry injunction) (noting that order moo led pe nding mo tion for appo intmen t of 
counsel); Peopl e ex rei. Jones v. Amaya, No. 713223, slip op. at 4 (Cal. Super. Ct. Orange County 
Nov. 10, 1993) (o rde r denying preliminary injunction) (same); see also Amicus Curiae Brie f in 
Opposition to Plai ntiff 's Motion fo r Pre limin ary Injuncti on at 17-19, "B " St. Boys (No. 735405 -
4) (filed June 14, 1994); Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Reques t fo r Appointed 
Counsel , Amaya (No. 713223) (filed Aug. 30, 1993). 
362 452 U. S. 18 (198 1) (5-4 decision). 
363 !d. at 20-24. 
364 !d. at 26-27. 
365 !d. at 30-32. The Court also acknowledged that in no othe r case had a court he ld th at an 
ind igent pare nt in terminatio n hea rings was not e ntitled to appointed counse l. !d. a t 30. 
366 !d. a t 31-32. This shift away from class-by-class determinations has bee n criticized by com-
me ntators. E.g., Jane E. Jackson, Lass ite r v. Department of Social Services: Th e Due Process 
Righ t 10 Appointed Counsel Left Hanging Un easily in the Mathews v. E ldridge Balance, 8 N. KY. 
L. R Ev. 513 , 527-32 (1981) (discuss ing merits of previous practice o f class-by-class ba lancing); 
Kevin W. Shaugh nessy, Note, Lass iter v. Department of Social Services: A New !nrerest Balanc-
ing Test jar indigent Civil Litigams, 32 CATH. U. L. REv. 261,282-83 (1982) (cri t ic izing case-by-
case approach). 
367 Lassiter , 452 U.S. at 31. 
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her child to be "extremely important. "368 It also identified two gov-
ernmental interests : the interest shared with the petitioner in an accu-
rate and just decision that protects the welfare of the child and a 
weaker inte rest in administrative economy.369 On the risk of errone-
o us deprivation of rights, the Court acknowledged that " the ultimate 
iss ues with which a te rmination hearing dea ls are not a lways simple, 
however commonplace they may be."37° 
D espite its recognition of the strength of the petitioner's private 
interest, the eq ui vocal nature of the gove rnment 's interest , and the 
risks of erroneo us deprivation caused by the complex ities of termina-
tio n hearings, the Court none theless co ncluded th at clue process did 
not require the appointment o f co unsel.37 1 In so concluding, the 
Court focu sed on the risk-of-error factor. finding it in favor of the 
government.372 The Court reasoned th at despite the admission o f 
hearsay evidence and the incompl eteness o f the petitioner 's defense , 
the presence of counsel would have changed nothing and concluded 
tha t the abse nce of grounds for crimina! charges, expert witnesses, and 
of " troublesome points of law, procedura l or substantive," justified 
the tria l court's re fus al to appoint counsel.373 
Since Lassiter, many courts have been reluctant to require on 
constitutional grounds the appointment of counsel in civil cases.374 
Nevertheless, if Lassiter's case-by-case approach is to be taken seri-
o usly, determining whether appointment of counsel is required with 
regard to antigang injunctions depends on an analysis of each individ-
ual case's facts. 
The application of the Mathews factors for appointment of coun-
sel is similar to their application for ex parte proceedings.375 First, as 
in the case of ex parte proceedings, gang members can asse rt a colora-
368 !d. at 27, 31. 
369 !d. at 27-28, 31. 
370 !d. at 30. 
37 1 !d. at 33 . 
372 !d. at 32-33. 
373 !d. 
374 See, e. g., Cloutterbuck v. Cloutterbuck, 556 A .2d 1082, 1085 -87 (D .C. 1989) (applying 
Lassi1er and ho lding no right to appointed counsel in civil protection order case despite the fact 
that violation of orde r would be enforced by contempt of court ); Resek v. State , 706 P.2d 288 
(A laska 1985) (holding no right to appointed counsel in civil forfeiture); see also Shaughnessy, 
supra note 366, at 285 (predicting that Lassiter would ''eviscerate[) the indigent's right to ap-
pointment of counsel" in all civil cases by "es ta blish[ing) a vi rtually un attainable pre requisite for 
appointment of co unsel"). Professor Cheh also sta tes that courts are unlikely to order appo int-
ment o f counsel in money penalty or RI CO forfeiture cases. Cheh , supra note 20, a t 1396 n.374 . 
In certa in civil actions, state legisla tors may opt fo r appointment of counsel. See L assiter, 452 
U.S. at 34 (noting 33 states and the District o f Col umbia statutorily provide for appointment of 
cou nse l in termination cases): cf, e.g., WYo . STAT. ANN. § 35 -21-103(e) (Michie Supp. 1993) 
(p rov id in g fo r appoin tment of counsel in civil proteclion orders aga inst domestic violence). 
375 See supra notes 349-60 and accompanying text. 
265 
NORTHWE STER N U NIVER SITY LAW REVIEW 
ble private interes t in their liberty,376 although this interest is arguably 
weaker than the private interest in parental rights asse rted in Lassiter. 
Furthermore, th e governm ental interests in antigang injunctions 
may be marginally weake r than the governmental inte rests in Lassiter, 
weighing in favo r of the appointment of counsel. Although th e state's 
interes t in administrative economy is the same as in Lassiter, its inter-
es t in an accurate decision is arguably weaker. U nlike in Lassiter, 
where the state bore a special burden to protect the welfare of the 
child,377 in the antigang injunctions the state is protecting th e public 
morals and property rights of the community, who lack th e vulnerabil-
ity that merits increased governm ental concern for children. 
However, the key difference is the second Mathews factor- the 
risk of e rroneous deprivatio n faced by alleged gang members. U nlike 
th e parental termination actions in Lassiter, antigang injunctions pres-
en t difficult problems of proof, the sufficiency of which a gang mem-
ber is unlikely to be able to challenge without counsel.378 M oreover, 
unlike in Lassiter, the predicate activities alleged often constitute 
grounds for criminal charges.379 The risk of erroneous deprivation of 
liberty is further heightened in injunction cases by the collateral bar 
rule. 380 And finally, the issues raised in this Comment and the differ-
ent treatment of identica l court orders in different cases381 demon-
strate that, unlike in Lassiter, antigang injunctions do present 
" troublesome points of law, procedural or substantive."382 
Therefore, courts will not likely extend criminal-type procedural 
protections in antigang injunction cases. However, the manner in 
which the Court applied Math ews in Good will likely require that al-
leged gang members receive a contested hearing before being sub-
jected to such injunctions. Similarly, the Court's application of 
Mathews in Lassiter arguably requires that indigent gang members 
have counsel appointed for them before being subjected to such 
injunctions. 
VI. CoNCLUSION 
In the final analysis , the antigang mJunctions survive constitu-
tional scrutiny with only minor alterations and will likely represent an 
important weapon in state and local governments' antigang a rsenal. 
Although the substantive constitutional claims are the most salient 
and have been the most heavily litigated , on closer inspection, these 
376 See supra notes 337-40, 349-51 and accompanying text. 
377 Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27. 
378 See supra part l!I.A.3. 
379 !d. at 32. 
380 See supra notes 279 -80, 353 and accompanying text. 
3S i See supra notes 46. 49, 51-53 and accompanying text. 
382 Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 32-33. 
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cla ims fall away fo r the simpl e reason that the gang members ' ac tions 
tha t give rise to the nuis ance in the fir st place are not sufficie ntly int i-
ma te or ex pressi ve to implicate the gang members ' const itutio nal 
rights to associati on and ex pression. Moreover, the actions that fo rm 
th e bas is of the nuisance claim are linked to illegal activity and can 
properly be res tricted whenever significant governm ental inte rests ex -
ist, notwithstanding some infringement of gang m embers' right to 
trave l or other subs tant ive co nstitutional rights. 
What does emerge from the analysis is the real dan ge r of guil t by 
associati on and vagueness . To avoid these problems, law enforcement 
must adhere to constitutionally permissible standards in determin ing 
who should be su bj ected to an antigang injunctio n, and judges mus t 
ca refu lly screen the evidence for each defendant to ma ke sure each 
case mee ts those standards. City attorneys should enj oin gang mem-
be rs by name and should refrain from pursuing gangs as un incorpo-
ra ted associati ons. D rafte rs o f injunctions should also include specific 
defi ni tions of what constitutes gang membership and what co nduct is 
e nj oined . Fo rtunate ly, sta tutes exist that can provide guid ance fo r the 
d rafting of such definiti ons or that can be incorporated d irectly by 
re fe rence. 
Last ly, judges evaluating antigang injunctions should be kee nl y 
aware that the use of such injunctions may deprive de fendants of im-
portant procedural protections , such as the right to a contested hea r-
ing and the right to appointed counsel. Although the defe ndants to 
antigang injunctions are probably not entitled to the full range o f pro-
cedural pro tections provided to criminal defendants, judges can still 
use the case-by-case approach of the Mathews balancing test to pro -
vide th e defendant with those procedural protections, such as a con-
tested hearing and appointed counsel , needed to ensure that each 
alleged gang member ge ts a fair hearing and that justice is se rved. 
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